Sam Cooper lays out why U.S. officials have treated British Columbia as a major CCP concern since at least 2017.

Summary by Probe International

In this episode of the Brave New Normal podcast, investigative journalist Sam Cooper of The Bureau exposes how British Columbia — and Vancouver in particular — has become a critical gateway for Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence operations, industrial-scale money laundering, and political interference across North America.

Host Jason James opened the discussion by noting that U.S. officials focused on CCP activity in the Western Hemisphere have expressed sustained concern about Vancouver since at least 2017, specifically around real-estate development and narcotics activity linked to China. He described Richmond, just south of Vancouver, as a center of global Chinese money-laundering and organized-crime operations, and observed that Vancouver is the only North American city with a dedicated Belt and Road office (related to the trillion-dollar global infrastructure and economic development strategy launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013). Cooper reinforced the point with sourcing, noting a U.S. military contact had indicated that Chinese intelligence maintains a special section devoted to interfering in British Columbia, comparable to its focus on California.

In Cooper’s assessment, Vancouver ranks among the top few nodes of Chinese interference in the Western world relative to population size, operating in tandem with Markham, Ontario, and activity that spills into New York State. He framed the city as a gateway into Canada and, by extension, the United States. Repeatedly grounding claims in Canadian intelligence material, Cooper Cited a 2022 CSIS document that described proxy networks attempting to elect the next leader of a major federal party (widely understood as the Conservatives after Erin O’Toole) and arranging a covert meeting between a provincial leadership candidate and Chinese consulate officials. The same document indicated that community groups acting as consulate proxies targeted the Vancouver mayoral race. A separate National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians study noted the Vancouver consul general’s claim of influence over roughly 100 community groups and Chinese efforts to cultivate journalists in British Columbia.

Against this backdrop, James and Cooper examined the collapse of B.C. Conservative leader Carrie-Lynn Findlay. James noted that Findlay had internally accused a significant party figure of signing up CCP members in Richmond; the figure in question was identified as Teresa Watt, a former Mandarin-language broadcasting executive who denied any foreign ties.

Cooper said Findlay did not retract the substance of her comments. Both observed that leaks, internal revolt, and her exit followed closely after she raised the issue. Cooper acknowledged ordinary domestic leadership problems but argued the timing was difficult to ignore, and said a campaign insider shared suspicions that the pressure extended beyond local politics. He drew a parallel to documented Chinese efforts against federal Conservative figures. Cooper has published multiple stories on associates in Premier David Eby’s orbit. He described photographs and fundraising ties linking Eby and NDP circles to members of the same community groups identified in CSIS material as consulate proxies, as well as to an individual a senior Canadian government source characterized as a known Asian organized-crime, United Front Work Department, and CCP associate.

Former Vancouver mayor Kennedy Stewart has publicly stated that Eby is aware of an RCMP investigation into a provincial cabinet minister over alleged China ties; Stewart has also spoken of Chinese involvement in his own election. When Cooper asked Eby’s office about elements of the 2022 CSIS document, the response was a strong denial accompanied by a veiled legal threat. Cooper left open the question of whether Eby or another 2022 provincial leadership candidate (from the 2022 Alberta leadership race) matched the document’s “Candidate Three.” The designation comes from the CSIS assessment describing a provincial leadership hopeful who allegedly had a covert meeting arranged with the Chinese consulate via a proxy.

Assessing the potential for Chinese influence in the provincial and concurrent municipal races as “off the charts,” Cooper pointed to the pattern of activity across levels of government in the Vancouver area. Cooper highlighted the approx. $1 billion BC Ferries financing, routed through a federal infrastructure bank associated with pro-Beijing figures, for vessels built in a Chinese shipyard. Redacted Public Safety Canada documents obtained by The Bureau flagged concerns that the route would pass near a signals-intelligence facility in Haida Gwaii and a Canadian Forces base on Vancouver Island, alongside supply-chain considerations.

James and Cooper also discussed the importation of tens of thousands of Chinese electric vehicles, which Cooper characterized as rolling collection platforms; he reported that a Toronto business chamber with documented CCP ties had proposed essentially the same EV-for-agricultural-tariff trade-off to Mark Carney days before Carney’s Beijing visit.

Cooper argued that Canada lacks the enforcement capacity the United States possesses—evident in American prosecutions of United Front operatives and CCP agents—and that deeper engagement therefore carries disproportionate risk.