Beijing’s July floods expose systemic failures in flood management and infrastructure prioritization.

By Probe International and Three Gorges Probe

VIDEO: The China Observer news channel reports a coordinated emergency discharge from 17 reservoirs across Beijing’s Miyun, Huairou, and Pinggu districts on July 27, 2025, triggered an unprecedented man-made deluge, with the simultaneous closure of 352 mountain flood channels compounding the disaster. The strategic release from Miyun Reservoir—critical to Beijing’s flood control system—devastated Taishitun Town, situated less than 10 kilometers downstream, where floodwaters transformed streets into torrents within minutes, overwhelming defenses and trapping residents.

Continuous heavy rainfall set off mountain floods across 49 villages, severing water supplies, communications, and electricity for more than 10,000 households. By July 29, the disaster had claimed 30 lives and forced 80,000 evacuations, with Miyun, Huairou, and Fangshan districts bearing the brunt of destruction. [Watch the China Observer report below].

Speaking today to our sister site, Three Gorges Probe, Chinese water specialist Wang Jian—a former Beijing water official—described the deluge as a once-in-a-century flood.

Contrasting Beijing’s annual average rainfall of around 600 mm, Wang highlighted the event’s staggering intensity: over 300 mm dumped citywide within days, with Langfangyu in Miyun District recording 573 mm—and isolated zones surpassing 700 mm. The event eclipsed Miyun’s 2023 annual total of 466 mm, underscoring the dramatic surge from a routine year to a relentless bombardment.

Beijing’s mountainous regions, particularly Miyun and Huairou, absorbed the storm’s initial fury, amplified by their vulnerability to northerly air currents. Positioned at the edge of a subtropical high-pressure system, the city’s southwesterly winds propelled a rainband northeast, where it collided with the Miyun-Huairou ranges. Forced upward by these slopes, the moisture-laden air underwent intense orographic lifting, supercharging rainfall. Wang likened the torrential flow to a “train” with its attendant “train effect” battering the region.

Meanwhile, decades of unsustainable mining in Beijing’s mountainous zones have critically destabilized ecosystems, fragmented landscapes, and stripped slopes of protective vegetation—conditions that turbocharged floodwaters into catastrophic chain reactions. Wang emphasizes this environmental unraveling primed the region for landslides and debris avalanches, culminating in an estimated 33 deaths across Beijing and 12 fatalities in Hebei’s flood-ravaged Miyun district, where denuded hills proved lethally unstable under the downpour.

Compounding the crisis, Beijing’s reliance on approx. 95 reservoirs—particularly the Miyun Reservoir, a linchpin of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project—has created a precarious balancing act. To sustain the capital’s drinking water supply, Miyun is kept at near-capacity year-round. But during extreme rainfall, this strategy backfires: excessive inflows force emergency discharges, overwhelming downstream areas. Wang notes this systemic flaw—where reservoirs designed to mitigate drought become flood hazards—exposes a critical vulnerability in Beijing’s water management, prioritizing urban security at the cost of regional stability.

Miyun District’s reservoirs, burdened by similar operational strains, are forced into coordinated discharges during extreme storms—synchronized releases that can create havoc for downstream areas, potentially shifting flood hazards into the vulnerable Hai River basin.

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