Three Gorges Probe

Endnotes

ENDNOTES

Introduction

1. “Yao Yilin Says That for the Time Being China
Will Not Consider Starting the Three Gorges Project Immediately,”
Zhongguo Tongxun She, 23 January 1989.

2. Edward Goldsmith and Nicholas Hildyard, The
Social and Environmental Effects of Large Dams, (San Francisco: Sierra
Club Books, 1984), p. xi.

3. CIPM Yangtze Joint Venture (CYJV), Three Gorges Project Water Control Project Feasibility Study, Vol. 1, p. 16-12.

4. Personal correspondence with Vaclav Smil, 3 April 1989.

Chapter One: 1920 – 1993

1. Robert Delfs in Peking, “China’s Rivers 1: Wealth and Woe,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 March 1990, p. 23.

2. Baruch Boxer, “China’s Three Gorges Dam: Questions and Prospects,” The China Quarterly 113, March 1988, p. 99.

3. Estimates of the cost overrun range from two to
four times the original Yangtze Valley Planning Office estimate. See Xu
Heshi, “Rushing to a Decision Should be Avoided; Discussion of Issues
Related to the Three Gorges Project Should Follow Scientific and
Democratic Principles,” Tian Fang and Lin Fatang (Eds.), Further
Discussions of Macro Decision-making of the Three Gorges Project,
(Changsha: Hunan Science and Technology Press, 1989), pp. 157-161.

4. Although Mao’s ‘grain-first’ policy did increase
the nation’s grain yields, the widespread environmental degradation it
triggered is undermining the nation’s long-term agricultural and
fisheries productivity. Land unsuited for cultivation – forests,
grasslands, wetlands, and even lakes, ponds, and coastal beaches – were
converted to grain fields as dictated by the central policy initiative.
Deforestation, accelerated soil erosion, and desertification followed
as billions of tonnes of topsoil were washed away from the land that
had been stripped of its natural cover. Deforestation along the
Yangtze’s upper reaches combined with land reclamation efforts (the
filling in of lakes and ponds) along the middle and lower reaches
significantly reduced the valley’s natural ability to retain
floodwaters. China’s traditional freshwater and coastal aquaculture
suffered a sharp decline in production due to widespread land
reclamation and water pollution.

For a more detailed discussion about the
environmental effects of Maoist policies in China, see Vaclav Smil, The
Bad Earth, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1984).

5. “Opinions Against Three Gorges Project Openly Published,” Zhongu Tongxun She, 24 March 1989, [in Chinese].

6. Economic Construction Group of the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Committee, “The Three Gorges Project
Should Not Go Ahead in the Short Term,” Chinese Environment and
Geography 1, no. 3, pp. 84-94.

7. Three Gorges Project Proposal, U.S. Three Gorges Working Group, July 1985.

8. Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) Briefing (transcript), 14 February 1989, Ottawa.

9. Peter G. Haines, “Canadian Competitiveness and
After Sales Service,” an address delivered at the Canadian Export
Association’s Annual Consultations with the Canadian International
Development Agency, Ottawa, 10-11 June 1986.

10. U.S. sinologist and State Department
consultant, Kenneth Lieberthal, may have another explanation for why
the American dam builders withdrew from the competition to conduct the
Three Gorges feasibility study:

“We must recognize that powerful interests in China
will continue to oppose this dam, and they will not hesitate to
campaign within the country against foreign powers that they can accuse
of trying to promote construction….America should be seen as a source
of prompt, friendly, high-quality, and sophisticated advice. It should
avoid becoming identified as an advocate of any particular position in
the domestic debate. Once the Chinese have decided to forge ahead with
actual dam construction, the United States should seek to become a
supplier of equipment, technical advice (including advice on project
management and financing…”

Source: Kenneth Lieberthal, United States
Participation in the Three Gorges Project, (Washington: Institute for
Values in Public Policy, 1988), p. 36.

11. Ronald Anderson, “Engineers’ Beachhead in Third
World Could Be Boon to Canadian Industry,” The Globe and Mail
(Toronto), 10 November 1987.

12. CIPM Yangtze Joint Venture (CYJV), Three Gorges Project Water Control Project Feasibility Study, Vol. 1A, p. 1-2.

13. CIDA signed a number of contracts in the autumn
of 1988 with consultants across the country to fulfil this monitoring
function. The firms included Both, Belle, and Rob of Montreal, Quebec,
Canergie Inc. of Baie d’Urfe, Quebec, Benjamin Development Planning
Consultants of Calgary, Alberta, and R.L. Walker and Partners of
Ottawa, Ontario. All contract documents were secured by Probe
International using the Access to Information Law.

14. Contract of October 14, 1988, between the
Canadian Department of Supply and Services and Peter Haines for
$208,677.60. This contract was also secured by Probe International
using the Access to Information Law. For his part in promoting the
export of Canadian engineering expertise, Peter Haines was awarded in
1987 the highest honour by the Association of Professional Engineers of
Ontario (APEO) – the Professional Engineers Gold Medal. In announcing
the award, the APEO explained that Peter Haines’ department within
CIDA, “is involved in 1,234 projects valued at about $7.4 billion.” The
APEO went on, “It is largely because of Engineer Haines’ personal
efforts and hard work that Canadian engineering companies have won
these projects [citing the Three Gorges Project] in the face of severe
international competition.” See APEO announcement, “In Recognition of
Excellence” 1987. Also see Anderson, “Engineers’ Beachhead,” The Globe
and Mail, 10 November 1987.

15. CIDA briefing (transcript), 14 February 1989.

16. In China, the Yangtze River is known as
Changjiang. See, Dai Qing, Changjiang Changjiang, (Guizhou People’s
Press, 1989), [in Chinese].

17. “Vigorous Debate Delays China Dam,” Christian Science Monitor, 1 March 1989, p. 6.

18. Ibid.

19. Frederic A. Moritz, “China’s Politics of the Environment,” Christian Science Monitor, 24 August 1989, p. 18.

20. Jan Wong, “Faced death penalty as dissident, Chinese woman leaves for U.S.,” The Globe and Mail, 23 December 1991.

21. Jan Wong, “U.S. wins no concessions in Beijing,” The Globe and Mail, 18 November 1991.

22. Personal correspondence with Douglas Lindores, Senior Vice-President, CIDA, 1 November 1991.

23. “Body Set Up to Study Huge China Dam, Many Scientists in Favour,” Reuter News Service, 15 July 1990.

24. Willy Wo-lap Lam, “Decision expected on Three Gorges dam plan,” South China Morning Post, 6 July 1990.

25. John Fox, “Chinese dam study flawed,” The
Financial Post, 20 September 1990. “Big Yangtze Dam Plan Challenged in
Canada,” International Herald Tribune, 20 September 1990.
“Environmentalists Demand Review of Canadian Engineering Report,”
Engineering Dimensions, November/December 1990. Ellen Saenger, “Dammed
if they do,” British Columbia Report, 8 October 1990. Moira Farrow,
“China dam study under fire,” Vancouver Sun, 19 September 1990.

26. Geoffrey Crothall, “China: Backing For Gorges Project,” South China Morning Post, 6 April 1991.

27. Ibid.

28. James L. Tyson, “Critics Urge China to Consult on Dam Plan,” The Cristian Science Monitor, 22 July 1991.

29. Graham Hutchings, “Peking To Approve Flooding of Farms By Hydroelectric Project,” The Daily Telegraph, 10 October 1991.

30. “China: Watering Down Flood Prevention,” South China Morning Post, 7 August 1991.

31. Willy Wo-lap Lam, “Journal Attacks Gorges Hydro-Electric Scheme,” South China Morning Post, 6 January 1992.

32. Geoffrey Crothall, “Academics Denounce Three Gorges Report,” South China Morning Post, 23 March 1992.

33. Personal correspondence with Michael Wilson, Canada’s International Trade Minister, 27 January 1993.

34. “China Wants Foreigners To Help It Build Dam,” Associated Press, Reuter News Service, 19 February 1992.

35. Daniel Kwan and Geoffrey Crothall, “One Third of
Delegates Refuse to Approve The Three Gorges Project,” South China
Morning Post, 4 April 1992.

36. As reported in “China Passes Dam Project, Many Abstentions,” Reuter News Service, 3 April 1992.

37. Linda Hossie, “CIDA strikes blow at big-dam agenda,” The Globe and Mail, 6 April 1992.

38. Ibid.

39. Yosahiko Lakurai, “China Lets Foreigners Enter Finance Market,” Nikkei Weekly, 29 August 1992.

40. “Construction Bank Establishes Branch To Fund
Three Gorges Project,” Xinhua News Agency as reported by BBC Monitoring
Service, 14 October 1992.

41. James McGregor, “China Bulldozing Ahead on Dam Project,” The Wall Street Journal, 19 January 1993.

42. Pan Jiazheng and Zhang Jinsheng, “Hydropower
development in China,” International Water Power & Dam
Construction, February 1993.

Chapter Three: Resettlement Plans

1. Tian Fang and Lin Fatang, “Population
Resettlement and Economic Development in the Three Gorges Reservoir
Area,” Chinese Geography and Environment 1, no. 4, 1988, pp. 90-100.

2. CIPM Yangtze Joint Venture (CYJV), Three Gorges Water Control Project Feasibility Study, Vol. 1, p. 1-4.

3. CYJV, Vol. 1, p. 1-3.

4. CYJV, Vol. 1, p. 16-8.

5. CYJV, Vol. 9, p. 2-2.

6. CYJV, Vol. 9, p. 2-9.

7. CYJV, Vol. 1A, p. 5-1.

8. The Yangtze catchment is the site of a dramatic
surge in forest loss. See Vaclav Smil, “Deforestation in China,” Ambio
12, no. 5, 1983, pp. 226-231.

9. CYJV, Vol. 8A, p. 5-6.

10. The NPL plus two metres is used to account for
wind-produced wave action along the reservoir shoreline. CYJV states
that two metres may be an insufficient safety margin, particularly in
the event of unstable slopes and extraordinary wave action which could
result in costly damage to urban areas. In what appears to be a
concession to the Chinese proponents, CYJV states it “has accepted the
2 m [metre] concept for the purposes of this study, but allowance has
also been made in the project construction cost estimates to deal with
any future unstable conditions along reservoir requisition lines”
(CYJV, Vol. 9, p. 5-4).

11. CYJV, Vol. 8A, p. 3-22.

12. CYJV, Vol. 8A, p. 5-9.

13. CYJV, Vol. 9, p. 2-9.

14. Fang Zongdai and Wang Shouzhong, “Resettlement
Problem of the Three Gorges Project,” Chinese Geography and Environment
1, no. 4, 1988, p. 86.

15. CYJV, Vol. 8A, p. 5-3.

16. CYJV, Vol. 9, p. 5-16.

17. The World Bank-funded Carajás iron project in
Brazil, completed in 1984, is one example. Since January 1988, the
mine, railway and port facilities built for export of unprocessed iron
ore (after Bank disbursements were completed) have also been used as
part of a scheme to produce pig iron in smelters along the railway
route. The charcoal used by the smelters has tremendous potential for
speeding deforestation in the eastern Amazon. (See P.M. Fearnside, “The
Charcoal of Carajás: Pig-iron Smelting Threatens the Forests of
Brazil’s Eastern Region,” Ambio 18, no. 2, 1989.) In this case, the
potential threat of the pig-iron plan had been known before the railway
was built but the World Bank chose not to consider these plans, which
were administratively separate from the bank-financed project. (See
P.M. Fearnside and J.M. Rankin, “Jari and Carajás: The Uncertain Future
of Large Silvicultural Plantations in the Amazon,” Interciencia 7, no.
6, 1982, p. 326.) Once smelting began and the danger was apparent to
the world, the Bank had no leverage with which to induce compliance
with clauses in the loan agreement committing Brazil to protect the
environment along the railway route.

18. CYJV, Vol. 9, p. 3-4.

19. Yao Ianguo, “Three Gorges Project: Dream and Reality,” Beijing Review 32, no. 27, pp. 19-30.

20. CYJV, Vol. 1A, p. 2-10.

21. CYJV, Vol. 9, p. 7-7.

22. See D.M. Lampton, “Water Politics,” The China
Business Review, July-August 1983, pp. 10-17; Liu Chiangming and L.J.C.
Ma, “Interbasin Water Transfer in China,” Geographical Review 73, no.
3, 1983, pp. 253-270; and CYJV, Vol. 8A, p. 6-14.

23. CYJV, Vol. 9, p. 7-7.

24. Ibid.

25. Lampton, “Water Politics,” p. 16.

26. P.M. Fearnside, “China’s Three Gorges Dam:
‚ÄòFatal’ Project or Step Toward Modernization?” World Development 16,
no. 5, 1988, pp. 615-630.

27. CYJV, Vol. 9, p. 3-2.

28. Tian and Lin, “Population Resettlement,” p. 97.

29. CYJV, Vol. 9, p. 3-3.

30. CYJV, Vol. 9, p. 4-21.

31. CYJV, Vol. 9, p. 7-9.

32. Tian and Lin, “Population Resettlement,” p. 93.

33. CYJV, Vol. 9, p. 7-19.

34. CYJV, Vol. 9, p. 7-18.

35. To compare flood risk with acceptable frost
risk, citrus is presently grown in areas where frost events kill, at
most, some trees once every 25 years. See CYJV, Vol. 9, p. 4-15.

36. CYJV, Vol. 9, p. 2-4.

37. See R. Gore and B. Dale, “Journey to China’s Far
West,” National Geographic 157, no. 3, 1980, p. 321; A. Samagalski and
M. Buckley, China: A Travel Survival Kit, (South Yara, Victoria,
Australia: Lonely Planet Publications, 1980), p. 57; and Fearnside,
“China’s Three Gorges Dam,” p. 619.

38. R.J.A. Goodland, Tribal Peoples and Economic
Development: Human Ecological Considerations, (Washington, D.C.: The
World Bank, 1982).

39. CYJV, Vol. 9, p. 4-10.

40. Personal communication, R.J.A. Goodland, 1987.

41. CYJV, Vol. 9, p. 5-7.

42. CYJV, Vol. 9, p. 5-10.

43. Ibid.

44. Document No. 12 (1986) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Vol. 9, Annex 1, p. 2.

45. CYJV, Vol. 9, p. 4-26.

46. CYJV, Vol. 9, Annex 1, p. 2.

47. CYJV, Vol. 9, p. 2-4.

48. CYJV, Vol. 1A, p. 2-14.

49. CYJV, Vol. 1, p. 17-17.

50. CYJV, Vol. 9, p. 7-11.

51. Ibid.

52. CYJV, Vol. 9, p. 7-5.

53. CYJV, Vol. 1, p. 17-1.

54. Even in Canada, where the CYJV feasibility study
was released in compliance with Probe International’s request using
Canada’s Access to Information Law, information was omitted from the
report, as indicated by a stamp specifying, for example, “information
deleted pursuant to 19(1), Access to Information Act,” in Volume 9
(Resettlement), p. 5-16.

55. CYJV, Vol. 8A, p. 6-14.

Chapter Four: Reservoir: Environmental Impacts

1. CIPM Yangtze Joint Venture (CYJV), Three Gorges Water Control Project Feasibility Study, Vol. 8A, p. 1-4.

2. CYJV, Vol. 8B, p. 2-4.

3. CYJV, Vol. 8, pp. 6-87, 6-88.

4. CYJV, Vol. 1, p. 16-10.

Chapter Six: Dowstream Environmental Impacts

1. CIPM Yangtze Joint Venture (CYJV), Three Gorges Water Control Project Feasibility Study, Vol. 1, p. 16-12.

2. Lacking specific data, CYJV made certain
assumptions and calculations as follows: an increase of 0.8 metres in
the Yangtze River level during the dry season would result in little
change in the level and surface area of Dongting Lake; conversely, for
May and October, a decrease of 0.7 metres and 1.3 metres, respectively,
would significantly affect surface areas. For Poyang Lake, CYJV
suggests that an increase of 0.5 metres in the Yangtze River level
during the dry season would have little effect, but that the same
increase from mid-March to mid-April would result in flooding of an
additional 200 square kilometres. To analyze the actual impact of the
dam on river and lake levels, the development of stage-area curves is
required. YVPO did not provide these to CYJV; CYJV did draft one for
Poyang Lake but used data from an unidentified source.

CYJV recommends that the Chinese establish a
computerized hydrologic database for the downstream components of the
river. This would make it possible to test the effect of different
water release patterns, thereby avoiding costly adverse impacts.
Whether the cost of conducting this analysis is included in CYJV’s
cost-benefit calculations is not clear.

3. CYJV, Vol. 8, p. 6-94.

Chapter Seven: Unresolved Issues: Perspective from China

1. See Chinese Academy of Sciences, Leading Group of
the Three Gorges Project Ecology and Environment Research Project,
Collected Papers on Ecological and Environmental Impact of the Three
Gorges Project and Countermeasures, (Beijing: Science Press, 1987), [in
Chinese], and Ecological and Environmental Impact of the Three Gorges
Project and Countermeasures, (Beijing: Science Press, 1988), [in
Chinese]. This research was conducted by the State Science and
Technology Commission from 1983 to 1986 in cooperation with the Chinese
Academy of Sciences.

2. Tian Fang and Lin Fatang, Discussions of Macro
Decision-making of the Three Gorges Project, (Changsha: Hunan Science
and Technology Press, 1988), [in Chinese], and Further Discussions of
Macro Decision-making of the Three Gorges Project, (Changsha: Hunan
Science and Technology Press, 1989), [in Chinese]. See also, Dai Qing,
Changjiang, Changjiang, (Guizhou People’s Press, 1989), [in Chinese].

3. “China Plans New Resettlement Rules,” Water Power and Dam Construction, March 1990, p. 2.

4. In a recent review of Chinese literature, Luk and
Whitney noted that with few exceptions, virtually none of the authors
opposed to the TGP cited population displacement as a major argument to
support their opposition to the project. See S.H. Luk and J. Whitney,
“Introduction to the Special Issue on the Three Gorges Project, Part
II,” Chinese Geography and Environment 1, no. 4, 1988, p. 14.

5. Tian Fang and Lin Fatang, “Population
Resettlement and Economic Development in the Three Gorges Reservoir
Area,” Chinese Geography and Environment 1, no. 4, pp. 90-100.

6. Chen Guojie, “The TGP Area is Already
Overpopulated and Local Resettlement Will Be a Disaster,” Soil and
Water Conservation Bulletin 7, no. 5, p. 42, [in Chinese].

7. Shi Deming, Yang Yangsheng, and Lu Xixi, “The
Impact of Soil Erosion on Sediment Sources in the TGP Reservoir Area
and Countermeasures,” Chinese Academy of Sciences, Collected Papers on
Ecological and Environmental Impact of the Three Gorges Project and
Countermeasures, pp. 498-521.

8. Tian and Lin, “Population Resettlement and Economic Development,” pp. 90-100.

9. Chen, “The TGP Area is Already Overpopulated,” pp. 42-46.

10. Fang Zongdai and Wang Shouzhong, “Resettlement
Problem of the Three Gorges Project,” Chinese Geography and Environment
1, no. 3, 1988, pp. 81-89.

11. Shi, Yang, and Lu, “The Impact of Soil
Erosion,” pp. 498-521; Wang Chaojun “Comprehensive Assessment of the
Ecological and Environmental Impact of the Three Gorges Project,”
Chinese Geography and Environment 1, no. 3, 1988, pp. 45-83; Shi Deming
“Speeding Up the Control of Soil Erosion in the Upper Reaches of the
Changjiang River is a Fundamental Requirement for the Construction of
the TGP,” Tian and Lin, Further Discussions, pp. 326-329; Fang Zongdai,
“Sediment Management in the Key to the Success or Failure of Water
Conservancy Projects and There is a Need to Properly Evaluate the
Impact of Human Activities on the Increase of Sediment Production,”
ibid., pp. 282-291; and He Naiwei, “Downstream Effects of Soil and
Water Conservation and Protection Forestry in the Upper Reaches of the
Changjiang River,” ibid., pp. 317-325.

12. CYJV looked at the annual sediment loads of the
Yangtze at Yichang and predicted no obvious trends, either increases or
decreases. The lack of a dramatic rise in sediment load can be
attributed in part to much of the sediment being trapped behind dams
upstream. See Chinese Academy of Sciences, Ecological and Environmental
Impact, p. 163.

13. Once these reservoirs become clogged with
sediment, which could be in 50 years or less, more sediment will be
flushed through the reservoirs and transported by the Yangtze, causing
a large increase in the sediment load at Three Gorges; see Gu Hengyu,
et al., “Sediment Sources and Trends of Sedimentation in the TGP
Reservoir Area,” Chinese Academy of Sciences, Collected Papers, pp.
522-541.

14. CIPM Yangtze Joint Venture (CYJV), Three Gorges Water Control Project Feasibility Study, Vol. 1, p. 11-14.

15. Qian Ning, Zhang Ren, and Chen Zhicong, “Some
Aspects of Sedimentation at the Three Gorges Project,” Chinese
Geography and Environment 1, no. 4, 1988, pp. 26-65.

16. Because of massive sedimentation upstream of
the Sanmen Gorge Dam, the structure had to be reconstructed in the
early 1970s. Zeng Qinghua, a former senior official with the Hydropower
Research Institute, claims that the operating principle of “storing
clear water and discharging the muddy water” (as advocated for the TGP)
has been quite successful in flushing out sediment that has built up
behind the dam. However, this operating procedure is proving
ineffective in removing sediment 120 kilometres upstream. See Zeng
Qinghua, “Experience from the Sanmenxia Reservoir Indicates that the
Operating Mode of ‘Storing the Clear Water and Discharging the Turbid’
Does Not Solve the Problem of Sedimentation at the Backwater Zone of
the TGP Reservoir,” Tian and Lin, Further Discussions, pp. 330-333.

17. Sun Yueqi, 90, is leader of the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC) and is one of China’s
most respected and dedicated detractors of the TGP. Fang is a former
senior engineer with the Ministry of Water Resources. See Fang Zongdai,
“The Flood Prevention Function of the Three Gorges Project –
Disadvantages Outweigh Advantages,” Chinese Geography and Environment
1, no. 4, pp. 66-80; Fang, “Sediment Management,” pp. 282-291; and Sun
Yueqi, “Basic Principles for the Changjiang River Basin Planning,” Tian
and Lin, Further Discussions, pp. 124-134.

18. Wang, “Comprehensive Assessment,” pp. 45-83; and, Qian, Zhang, and Chen, “Some Aspects of Sedimentation,” pp. 26-65.

Other references for chapter seven

Economic Construction Group of the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Committee. “The Three Gorges Project Should Not
Go Ahead in the Short Term.” Chinese Environment and Geography 1, no.
3, 1988, pp. 84-94.

Fearnside, P.M. “China’s Three Gorges Dam: Fatal’
Project or Step Toward Modernization?” World Development 16, no. 5,
1988, pp. 615-630.

Luk, S.H. and Whitney, J. “Introduction to the
Special Issue on The Three Gorges Project, Part I.” Chinese Geography
and Environment 1, no. 3, 1988, pp. 3-13.

Xu Heshi. “Rushing to a Decision Should be Avoided;
Discussion of Issues Related to the TGP Should Follow Scientific and
Democratic Principles.” Tian Fang and Lin Fatang (Eds.) Further
Discussions of Macro Decision-making of the Three Gorges Project.
Changsha: Hunan Science and Technology Press, 1989, in Chinese.

Chapter Eight: Flood Control Analysis

1. CIPM Yangtze Joint Venture (CYJV), Three Gorges Water Control Project Feasibility Study, Vol. 4, p. 1.

2. CYJV, Vol. 7, p. 1-21, and p. 9-4, Table 9.2.

3. CYJV, Vol. 7, p. 7-1.

4. CYJV, Vol. 7, p. 7-10.

5. CYJV, Vol. 1, p. 11-11.

6. CYJV, Vol. 7, p. 4-3.

7. CYJV, Vol. 7, p. 1-2.

8. CYJV, Vol. 7, p. 9-32.

9. CYJV, Vol. 7G, p. 1-2.

10. CYJV, Vol. 7F, p. 6-1.

11. CYJV, Vol. 1, p. 16-3.

Chapter Nine: Missing Energy Perspectives

1. Baruch Boxer, “China’s Three Gorges Dam: Question and Prospects,” The China Quarterly 113, 1988, pp. 94-108.

2. Actual kilowatt-hours per capita figures for 1986
to 1987 were: East China 370, Central China 250, Eastern Sichuan 200,
Brazil 1400, Mexico 1200, U.S.A. 10,700, and Canada 18,700. See UNO,
Yearbook of Energy Statistics.

3. V. Smil, “China’s Energy,” (1990). Report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment of the United States Congress.

4. See State Statistical Bureau (SSB), China
Statistical Yearbook 1988, (Beijing, 1988); and V. Smil, Energy in
China’s Modernization, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1988).

5. See SSB, China Statistical Yearbook 1988.

6. See Sun Yueqi, “Why I Am Against the Project,”
Beijing Review 32, no. 27, 1989, pp. 31-35; and Tian, Fang and Lin
Fatang, (Eds.), More on the General Decision Concerning the Three
Gorges Project, (Changsha: Hunan Provincial Science and Technology
Publishing House, 1989), [in Chinese].

7. SSB, China Statistical Yearbook 1988.

Other references for chapter nine

Education and Science Society. 1986. Symposium on the Three Gorges Project. Education and Science Society, New York.

Fearnside, Philip M. 1988. “China’s Three Gorges
Dam: ‘Fatal’ project or step toward modernization?” World Development
16, pp. 615-630.

Smil, Vaclav. 1990. General Energetics, John Wiley, New York.

Chapter Ten: Dam Safety Analysis

1. The methodology used for estimating ground
acceleration described in International Commission on Large Dams
(ICOLD) bulletin 46 is based on U.S. Bureau of Reclamation procedures.
Within the U.S. these procedures have been criticized by engineering
geologists as too optimistic in estimating MCEs. For this MCE, a
horizontal ground acceleration of [0.17g] – 0.17 multiplied by
acceleration due to gravity (g) – was estimated by CYJV as a “starting
point for safety evaluation.” Also, CYJV underestimates the vertical
acceleration as [0.1g], two-thirds that of the horizontal acceleration
value.

2. CIPM Yangtze Joint Venture (CYJV), Three Gorges Water Control Project Feasibility Study, Vol. 4, p. 4-14.

3. “Earthquake forces considered in the standard
method for design of concrete gravity dams are seriously deficient and
this has led to a number of bad features in the design
practice….Because the dynamic nature of the earthquake response
problem is ignored, the specifications for earthquake forces in the
standard design loads for concrete gravity dams is seriously
deficient.” Source: A.K. Chopra, “An Evaluation of the Koyna Dam
Earthquake,” presented at the International Commission on Large Dams
(ICOLD) Conference Proceedings, University of Southampton, 1976.

4. CYJV, Vol. 4, p. 5-11.

5. CYJV, Vol. 4, p. 12-7.

6. CYJV, Vol. 4, p. 12-12.

Chapter Eleven: Sedimentation Analysis

1. CIPM Yangtze Joint Venture (CYJV), Three Gorges Water Control Project Feasibility Study, Vol. 1, p. 11-14.

2. CYJV, Vol. 5, p. 1-6.

3. CYJV, Vol. 5, p. 1-4.

4. CYJV, Vol. 5C, fig. 5.3.

5. CYJV, Vol. 5, pp. 6-16, 6-30.

6. CYJV, Vol. 5, p. 2-4.

7. CYJV, Vol. 5, p. 8-3.

8. CYJV, Vol. 1, p. 11-2.

9. 1. Empirical regime equations based on slope data from other irrigation canals and natural rivers.

2.
Predictions of slope based on sediment transport equations and what is
assumed to be the characteristics of the bed load material.

3. A one-dimensional numerical model that
simulates the flow of sediment through the reservoir and calculates
deposition and scour from successive floods based on the hydrodynamic
and sediment transport equations.

10. American Society of Civil Engineers, Sedimentation Manual, p. 128.

11. “According to the Yichang Hydrological Gauging
Stations’s 30 year survey, the Yangtze river’s suspended load averages
526x106t annually and the bed load is 8.6x106t.” Pan Jiazheng and Zhang
Jinsheng, “The Three Gorges project goes ahead in China,” International
Water Power and Dam Construction, February 1993.

12. CYJV, Vol. 5, p. 2-3.

13. Ibid.

14. CYJV, Vol. 4, p. 3-16.

15. CYJV, Vol. 5D, fig. 3.1.

16. CYJV, Vol. 5J, p. 4-7.

Chapter Twelve: Economic and Financial Aspects

1. CIPM Yangtze Joint Venture (CYJV), Three Gorges Water Control Project Feasibility Study, Vol. 1, p. 1-5.

2. CYJV, Vol. 1, p. 2-1.

3. CYJV, Vol. 3, p. 1-3.

4. CYJV, Vol. 1, p. 1-5.

5. CYJV, Vol. 3, p. 5-14.

6. See Vijay Paranjpye, High Dams on the Narmada, (New Delhi: Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage, 1990).

7. CYJV, Vol. 3, p. 7-6.

8. CYJV, Vol. 3, p. 3-8.

9. CYJV, Vol. 3, p. 7-9.

10. CYJV, Vol. 3, p. 7-9.

11. CYJV, Vol. 3, pp. 4-2, 4-3.

12. CYJV, Vol. 3, p. 4-10.

13. Ibid.

14. CYJV, Vol. 1, pp. 2-2, 17-3, 17-19; Vol. 3, pp. 1-2, 1-4.

 

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Categories: Three Gorges Probe

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