The release of records into the firing of two scientists at Winnipeg’s National Microbiology Laboratory reveal a five-alarm security fire at what is supposed to be Canada’s most secure microbiology lab.

By Omid Ghoreishi | Andrew Chen [Contributor] | Published by The Epoch Times

The following report by The Epoch Times reveals the extent of the breach that took years to become public. Scroll to the end for a downloadable copy of the declassified intelligence document compiled by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).

In July 2019, scientists Xiangguo Qiu and her husband, Keding Cheng, were escorted out of Winnipeg’s National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) by the RCMP. As Canada’s only biosafety level (BSL) 4 facility — the world’s most secure classification — the NML is entrusted to handle and study the most deadly and dangerous pathogens. In January 2021, Ms. Qiu and Mr. Cheng were fired.

In the months prior to her expulsion, Ms. Qiu had overseen the shipment of lethal viruses to the Wuhan Institute of Virology in China. It was also discovered that Ms. Qiu had maintained ongoing partnerships with China’s top military virologists, among other collaborations that she had not revealed, including gain-of-function research.

The recently declassified intelligence document compiled by CSIS is part of a 600-page package on the firing of the two scientists. In their review of the document, The Epoch Times describes the series of events as follows:

In March 2019, the Winnipeg lab shipped 15 strains of Nipah and Ebola viruses to Wuhan. The request for the shipment was facilitated through Ms. Qiu. But the declassified documents show that Ms. Qiu also sent antibodies and other material to China without prior approval.

Gain-of-function (GOF) involves increasing either the lethal level or the transmissibility of pathogens, or both. Due to its risky nature, its use on lethal viruses is forbidden in many parts of the world.

The documents reveal Ms. Qiu and Mr. Cheng left restricted visitors in the Winnipeg lab unescorted, and also allowed them to access the NML’s secure network. Some of the visitors, who were Chinese nationals, attempted to remove material from the lab, and also downloaded material from the computer network onto personal devices.

At least one of the visitors to the Winnipeg lab was from the Beijing Institute of Biotechnology, a university used by China’s People’s Liberation Army for the study of advanced biological technology. CSIS says open-source material has shown the woman wearing Chinese military attire.

The documents say Ms. Qiu gave access to at least two employees of a “PRC [People’s Republic of China] institution whose work is not aligned with Canadian interests.”

Another restricted visitor to the NML was a senior technician at the Wuhan lab, whom CSIS says may have been the first researcher from China to come to Canada that Ms. Qiu facilitated directly herself. CSIS mentions the hiring of the technician as part of an agreement between Ms. Qiu and the WIV, which included providing “research expenses, instruments and equipment, research assistance,” and other items to “guarantee the normal operation of [Ms. Qiu’s] scientific and research work.”

At one point in 2018, the senior technician attempted to remove 10 tubes from the Winnipeg lab, the documents say.

Ms. Qiu and Mr. Cheng were also willing participants in China’s “talent programs,” which are aimed at boosting China’s national technological capabilities and pose a “serious threat” by “incentivizing economic espionage and theft of intellectual property,” CSIS says.

As well, the two collaborated with Chinese military leaders who are in charge of research into biological weapons, biosafety, bio-defence, and bio-terrorism.

The document said that Mr. Qiu and Mr. Cheng were not truthful in their responses to the investigators, and that their continued employment at the NML posed a security risk.

“[The disclosed information show Ms. Qiu’s] complete lack of candour regarding her relationship with [PRC] institutions; and her reckless judgment regarding decisions that could have impacted public safety and the interests of Canada,” CSIS said.

The report continues at the publisher’s website here

The declassified intelligence document [downloadable]