Unresolved Issues: Perspectives from China

by Shiu-hung Luk, Ph.D., and Joseph Whitney, Ph.D.

The
Chinese feasibility study for the Three Gorges Project, which was
conducted under the aegis of the State Planning Commission,* remains a
secret government document. From 1987 to 1989, while official studies
were under way, numerous research papers¹ on the feasibility of the Three Gorges Project were circulated and published in Chinese journals.

During
this period, the Chinese press reported that views critical of the
project were under-represented in official documents and that a vast
number of critics had not been heard by decision makers in the upper
echelons of China’s central government. Since then, several collections
of essays such as those edited by Tian Fang and Lin Fatang, senior
officials with the State Planning Commission, have been published in
China as a forum for dissenting views.²

This
chapter reviews the key unresolved issues that have been raised within
China about the Three Gorges Project and have not been adequately
addressed by the CYJV study.

Resettlement

The scale
of resettlement required for the Three Gorges Project surpasses that of
other major dams such as the Sanmenxia Dam on the Yellow River, the
Danjiangkou Dam on the Han River, and the Wujiangdu Dam on the Wu
River. China’s record on resettlement is tragic: according to China’s
Ministry of Water Resources,* 30 to 40 percent of the 10 million people
who have been relocated to make way for hydroelectric dams since the
late 1950s are still impoverished and lacking adequate food and
clothing.³ Although China has recently improved its
guidelines for resettlement in accordance with the World Bank’s
criteria for “successful resettlement,” the people who would be
displaced or affected by the Three Gorges have no guarantee they would
be spared the hardship and suffering associated with such schemes.

Proponents of the Three Gorges Project are well
aware of the potential for social upheaval and conflict, so it is
disturbing that none of the writings reviewed, either Chinese or
foreign, present any evidence that the people who would be affected by
the scheme have been consulted about the impact resettlement would have
on their lives.⁴

The Chinese
resettlement plans, as reviewed by CYJV, suggest that the displaced
population could migrate uphill, so that even though they would be
forced to abandon their town or village, they could remain in the same
county.⁵ On paper this may seem reasonable, but after
examining the conditions in the upland areas, it is obvious that this
scheme would not be successful.

Land Availability

Fundamentally,
the problem is that the best land in the area is in the valleys which
would be flooded by the reservoir. This land is already 15 percent
overpopulated,⁶ and the remaining land is further uphill,
too steep to cultivate properly, and relatively infertile. In fact,
Chinese soil scientists have estimated that five times the area of less
productive uphill land would be needed to replace the 26,800 hectares
of prime agricultural land which would be lost to the reservoir.⁷ This amount of land is simply unavailable in this area.

In
addition to the problem of finding replacement land, Chinese critics
have doubts about the plans to integrate resettlement with natural
resource development as a means of creating jobs for the
non-agricultural sector.⁸ They question not only the
economic viability of some of the proposed schemes, but whether the
necessary capital and resources would ever be made available.⁹

Development Plans

For
example, the proposed salt mine development in the Three Gorges region
would probably have difficulty competing with salt mines that are well
established elsewhere in the province. Vague plans to develop tourist
industries conflict with plans to expand polluting industries in the
same region. And the proposal, endorsed by CYJV, for intensive orange
and dairy production appears similarly unworkable.

Resettlement Costs

• According to CYJV, over one-half of the land slated
  for rural resettlement is situated above 800 metres elevation. Because
  of the cost of access and the fact that cultivation is limited to a
  small range of crops at higher elevations, development there would be
  more expensive. CYJV apparently failed to include this cost in its
  estimates.
• CYJV assumes the cost of relocating nearly
  a dozen cities and scores of towns, along with all their basic
  infrastructure such as roads and water supply systems, in the Three
  Gorges region by assuming it would cost about the same as rebuilding
  Tangshan, a northeastern city, with a population of 1.4 million, after
  it was totally devastated by an earthquake in 1976. But state planning
  officials, Tian and Lin, point out that this is an underestimation
  because Tangshan was rebuilt on level ground compared to the rugged
  hilly terrain in the Three Gorges region.¹⁰

The Impact of Upstream Land Use Changes on Soil Erosion, Sedimentation and Flooding

Editor’s Note: The rate of sedimentation in the
proposed reservoir during its lifespan depends, in part, on land use
and soil erosion patterns upstream. Quantifying the actual long-term
rates and patterns of sedimentation for a number of decades is a
complex issue which has long been a source of contention among
scientists. Here the authors explain why proponents wrongly discount
the impacts of sedimentation which could significantly shorten the
useful life of the Three Gorges Dam.

Numerous Chinese authorities¹¹
report that soil erosion, and therefore the sediment load in the
Yangtze River, is increasing because of population pressure and land
degradation upstream of the Three Gorges. If the Three Gorges Project
is built, some scientists are predicting a 15 percent increase in
expected rates of sedimentation during the reservoir’s lifespan, and
others are predicting even higher increases.¹² The impact of
resettlement alone – due to activities such as land clearing, cutting
down trees for fuel, mining, and extraction of building materials – is
expected to cause an annual 2.5 percent increase in the Yangtze’s
sediment loads.

CYJV, on the other hand, suggests that no obvious
increases or decreases in the Yangtze’s sediment load have been
observed, and it makes the overly conservative assumption that sediment
would deposit in the reservoir at a fixed rate over time. In addition,
CYJV’s estimate of the amount of sediment which would become trapped in
the reservoir appears low for several reasons. First, it assumes that
sediment which is currently building up behind dams on upstream
tributaries will remain there indefinitely. But within a few decades or
less, these reservoirs will become clogged with sediment, at which time
the dams will have to be taken out of operation in order to flush out
the accumulated sediment. From there, the sediment will eventually be
flushed into the Yangtze River, causing a significant increase in the
river’s total sediment load.

Yangtze Valley Planning Office reports suggest
building even more dams upstream as a strategy to substantially reduce
sediment input to the Three Gorges reservoir.¹³ Technically,
this would reduce sedimentation in the reservoir for a short term but
it would eventually cause sedimentation problems further upstream.
Furthermore, to build more dams to control sediment would ignore
upstream land degradation and soil erosion which are the cause of the
high sediment load problem.*

Secondly, CYJV assumes that only 20 percent of
soil eroded from land upstream of the Three Gorges ever reaches the
Yangtze River. This discounts a significant amount of eroded soil,
which is first transported by floodwater and deposited onto flood
plains and other low-lying areas, but would eventually be flushed into
the Yangtze.

Proposed Sediment Management Strategy

Based
on its initial assumptions about rates and volume of sedimentation,
CYJV predicts that in the early years of dam operation, 60 to 70
percent of the river’s sediment would be trapped in the reservoir. The
coarser sediment would deposit in the upper end of the reservoir, known
as the backwater reach, gradually forming a delta which would encroach
on the dam’s useful storage capacity. Also, the river channel would
become raised, thereby increasing upstream flood levels and obstructing
navigation, particularly in the dry season. According to CYJV, the
reservoir slope would become flatter and reach a state of equilibrium
after about 100 years. CYJV claims that at that time, there would be no
net additional deposition or erosion of sediment in the reservoir.
Moreover, CYJV believes that “If the reservoir is operated as proposed,
about 90% of its effective storage can be preserved indefinitely.”¹⁴
To prevent unwanted sediment buildup in the reservoir and thereby
preserve long-term storage capacity in the reservoir, water levels
would be lowered to the flood control level (FCL) of 140 metres during
the flood season. At this time the flow is carrying most of its
sediment load, so water is released rather than stored to avoid
sediment deposition. After the flood flows when the water is relatively
sediment-free, the reservoir would be raised to the normal pool level
(NPL) of 160 metres and maintained at that level as required for power
generation. In other words, the operating rule would be to store water
when clear and release when turbid.

Critics suggest that this proposed operating procedure would not be effective for several reasons:

• Although some of the finer sediments would be
  flushed out, this operation would have no effect on coarser sediments
  which are expected to form a delta beginning several hundreds of
  kilometres upstream.
• At the reservoir backwater, 600
  kilometres upstream of the dam, floodwater would continue to deposit
  sediment as they flow into the reservoir, quite independently of how
  the dam is operated. And as more sediment accumulates, the rate of
  build-up increases, extending deposition further and further upstream.

Proponents, on the other hand,
suggest that this problem would be limited because at the end of each
dry season, water levels in the reservoir would be lowered, allowing
the river to erode the sand bars and shoals which are formed during
each flood season (this process is known as retrogressive scouring).¹⁵
In practice, however, retrogressive scouring has been ineffective
hundreds of kilometres upstream of dams such as the Sanmenxia Dam on
the Yellow River.¹⁶ And in the case of the Three Gorges
Project, the reservoir is nearly five times the length of the Sanmenxia
reservoir, which makes it even more doubtful that the river would
effectively scour sediment deposits away. To make matters worse, the
narrow Tongluo Gorge, located 15 kilometres downstream of Chongqing,
acts as a bottleneck in the river so that any lowering of water levels
at Three Gorges to flush sediment through would have a negligible
impact on the problem of sedimentation near Chongqing.

Backwater Sedimentation and Increased Flooding

Sun and Fang¹⁷
believe that the city of Chongqing would face an increased flood risk
because backwater sedimentation would raise the elevation of the river
channel. CYJV recognizes that significant sedimentation would occur,
thereby increasing the level of flooding near Chongqing, although it
appears it did not quantify the amount and cost of dredging required to
reduce the flood risk.

Navigation

Editor’s Note: The Yangtze River is a major
east-west artery of trade and commerce, and is strategically important
to the economic development of southwest China. The 660-kilometre reach
of the river between Yichang and Chongqing is characterized by numerous
narrow gorges, strong currents and dangerous shoals. Because of this,
navigation is treacherous, and the cost of shipping through this reach
is more than double the cost below Yichang. According to proponents,
the Three Gorges reservoir would transform this hazardous reach into a
deep, gently flowing waterway, which would allow large ocean-going
vessels access to the river port of Chongqing.¹⁸ The
resultant increase in shipping would, in turn, facilitate the
development of Chongqing as the largest municipality and inland port in
southwestern China.

CYJV defines navigation
benefits as equivalent to the reduced transportation costs of moving
cargo and passengers through this reach of the Yangtze. The calculation
of benefits is largely dependent on, and proportional to, the projected
increases in shipping traffic.

Increased Volume of Shipping on the Yangtze

Members
of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC), an
influential group of “opposition” parties, are sceptical about the
Ministry of Communication’s projected five-fold increase (an annual
goal of 50 million tonnes) in shipping as a result of the improved
navigation. CYJV’s estimate of 41 million tonnes is equally
theoretical, since no thorough study has yet been done to determine the
volume of shipping traffic that could be moved through the locks under
various scenarios of vessel and tow size, proportion of passenger
vessels to freight vessels, and with various traffic control
procedures.

Impact of Sedimentation on Navigation

CYJV
expects that backwater sedimentation would obstruct navigation in the
channel and access to river port facilities near Chongqing,
particularly in the dry season. CYJV failed to investigate this, and
also the feasibility and cost of dredging operations which could be
required on a massive scale.

Another issue not yet raised by proponents is the
impact of sediment releases from the Three Gorges Project on the
Gezhouba Dam which is 40 kilometres downstream. These sediment releases
could form a delta where the Yangtze River slows down to meet the
Gezhouba reservoir. As would be the case upstream of the Three Gorges
Project, sedimentation in the Gezhouba reservoir would not only reduce
its limited storage capacity but, without continuous dredging, could
also impede navigation.

Navigation Benefits Achievable Without the Three Gorges Project

CYJV
provides preliminary evidence that without the Three Gorges Project the
present volume of shipping traffic (6 to 9 million tonnes) could be
roughly tripled (17 to 28 million tonnes) depending on the size and mix
of vessels. They also state that better traffic control procedures,
extended hours for navigation, more powerful tug boats, and improved
barge design could all serve to increase channel capacity beyond
present limits. If these improvements were implemented, the volume of
shipping traffic could equal or possibly exceed CYJV’s projections for
the Three Gorges Project.

The Multipurpose Conflict

Quite
apart from the technical problem of managing the sediment that could
impede navigation through this reach, and the wide range of complex
factors influencing improved transportation on the Yangtze, neither
CYJV nor the various Chinese sources have dealt adequately with one of
the most important issues: the inherent conflict associated with
operating a multipurpose dam. Intended to generate power, provide flood
control, and improve navigation, the reservoir would have to be
maintained at different levels to achieve optimum benefits for each
function.

Generally speaking, for power generation and
navigation, the higher the water levels in the reservoir the better.
Conversely, for flood control – the primary purpose of the dam – water
levels should be as low as possible prior to the flood season in
preparation for storing peak floodwater. To complicate the matter
further, the operation for controlling sediment requires that water be
stored only in the dry season when it is relatively sediment-free, and
released in the flood season when the river’s sediment load is highest.

Proponents claim that shipping costs for vessels
proceeding upstream against the strong current would be reduced due to
the slower velocities in the reservoir. But if little water is actually
being stored, in order to avoid sediment buildup, then it is not clear
whether velocities through the gorges would be significantly reduced.
Neither is it clear what the impact of operating to serve peak
electricity demands in the dry season would be on flows downstream of
the Three Gorges Dam and the Gezhouba reservoir. If, for example, the
flows were too low, navigation depths would be insufficient and
navigation would be impeded through this section.

According to CYJV, the 160-metre recommended
scheme would eliminate all but one of the 32 existing bottlenecks
through the narrow gorges reach of the river and the 12 existing
winching stations.* However, CYJV downplays the fact that the reservoir
would, at best, be held at this level for only six months of the year
(November to April). For the remainder of the year, the reservoir would
either be at the flood control operating level (FCL) of 140 metres or
fluctuating somewhere between FCL and normal pool level – assuming
floodwater are not stored. When the reservoir is held at the FCL,
anywhere from five to eight bottleneck sections would still exist in
the 60-kilometre reach downstream of Chongqing. Proponents have failed
to consider how the bottlenecks at low water levels would affect larger
ships which are expected to travel the improved waterway.

Conclusions

Despite the
major investment of time and effort on the part of CYJV in preparing
the feasibility study for the Three Gorges Project, there remain
serious conceptual and data shortcomings with respect to resettlement,
reservoir sedimentation, upstream flooding, multi-purpose operation and
navigation benefits. Because a large number of potential costs have not
been evaluated by proponents, and are not included in the cost-benefit
analysis, it is by no means certain that the benefits of the Three
Gorges Project outweigh the costs. If a rigorous cost-benefit analysis
of the Three Gorges Project were to include these costs, the proposed
scheme would appear far less economical than its proponents now claim.

Sources and Further Commentary

*The
State Planning Commission plays a central role in China’s energy and
economic planning, and reports directly to the State Council.

*The Ministry of Water Resources and Electric
Power has been divided into two distinct ministries, the Ministry of
Water Resources and the Ministry of Energy.

*Proponents of the project also argue that there
are advanced technologies available to reduce soil erosion although
they tend to be too expensive. Less expensive soil erosion control
measures, such as terracing, planting grass, shrubs, and trees, would
be ineffective because any planted vegetation is likely to be denuded
by people in desperate need of fuelwood for cooking. In any case,
proponents do not include the cost of implementing soil erosion
strategies, necessary for reducing sediment input to the reservoir, in
the project cost estimate.

*Winching stations are situated at narrow
sections of the Yangtze River. A mechanical winch and steel cable,
attached to the oncoming vessel by a tugboat, is used to pull the boat
through the narrow section.

Continue to Chapter 8

Back to
Chapter 6