Editor’s note: In January 1999, Wei Yi, a respected Chinese sociologist, published an astonishing article in Strategy and Management, the journal of a Beijing-based think-tank. For the first time, in a mainstream publication, his article exposed the truth about Three Gorges dam resettlement problems – an operation involving the relocation of more than one million people. Dr. Wei, writing under a pseudonym, recommended that the dam height be lowered to minimize social and environmental problems. Widely covered by the foreign press, his article caused a stir. Three Gorges Probe reprinted Dr. Wei’s article, “Major problems and hidden troubles in the relocation of Three Gorges Project,” in May 1999.

Now Dr. Wei critically reviews the revised “Resettlement Rules and Regulations of the Three Gorges Dam,” approved by the State Council on Feb. 15, 2001.

Comments on the revised “Resettlement rules and regulations of the Three Gorges dam”

In August 1993, former Premier Li Peng promulgated “The resettlement rules and regulations for building the Three Gorges Project on The Yangtze River,” which I will refer to as the “1993 Rules and Regulations.” The first phase (1993-1997) and the second phase (1998-2003) of the Three Gorges’ resettlement operation have been plagued with piercing problems that the “1993 Rules and Regulations” could not address. So, by May 1999, after Zhu Rongji had taken power from Li Peng and become premier, he launched a substantial revision of the Three Gorges’ resettlement policy. On Feb.15, 2001 the State Council approved the new rules for resettlement and on Feb. 21, 2001 Premier Zhu Rongji proclaimed them. I will refer to them as the “2001 Rules and Regulations.”

What is new about the “2001 Rules and Regulations”?

First, with respect to rural resettlement, migrants need not now be resettled only in the agricultural sector, but can be resettled in high-yielding ecological agriculture.¹The industrial and service sectors are also now vigorously encouraged to absorb rural relocatees, and the policy of local resettlement is replaced by a combination of local and distant resettlement. For those migrants who will settle in distant lands, the new rules suggest that the beneficiary regions below the dam should be responsible for sharing the task of resettling them.

Second, with respect to the relocation and reconstruction of public property, infrastructure, and industrial enterprises, compensation is based on the original size, the original standard, and the cost of restoring the original function of the property lost. But the new directive goes further in emphasizing that compensation should reflect the actual submersion loss, reasonable development, and the cost of upgrading and reorganizing industrial structures. ²

Third, environmental protection is repeatedly stressed in the new resettlement rules. This indicates that the huge floods that occurred along the Yangtze River in 1998, which signaled the extent of the environmental degradation along the Yangtze and thus alarmed China’s leadership, have had an impact on the new resettlement policy.

Fourth, a new special section about how to use the resettlement funding has been added. Notably, this new section states that “the administrative commission for urban resettlement is not a financial accounting unit and the funding earmarked for resettlement cannot be transferred through it.” As the relocation record has shown, because of mismanagement, several temporary administrative units (like the administrative commission for urban resettlement) were frequently accused of taking bribes and spending the resettlement funds on unrelated activities. The new directive attempts to remove such a unit’s power of controlling the financial resources and thus to prevent the resettlement funds from being misused.

Fifth, the penalties for corruptly using resettlement funds are greatly strengthened. This must surely reflect the sentiments of Premier Zhu, who recently described the resettlement funds as “an untouchable deadly high-tension line.”³

Finally, other items have been added. For example, the new regulations place emphasis on the quality of resettlement projects and the establishment of a migrants’ archive, which will provide recorded information about migrants.

To be sure, these changes show that authorities are more pragmatic and have learned lessons from past resettlement mistakes. If the new measures can be implemented effectively and adequately, some principal problems mentioned in my article “Major problems and hidden troubles in the relocation of Three Gorges Project” (published in Strategy and Management, 1999) could be diminished, reduced, and even eliminated.

But, serious problems remain with the new regulations

First, the identification of migrant status, which has been a subtle, sensitive, and complicated issue that has caused conflict and confusion among real migrants, local villagers and local officials, remains a problem. In many cases, those who legitimately need to be relocated are particularly aggrieved that those who do not need to be resettled, or are even living outside the reservoir area, are illegitimately granted migrant status and, therefore, the right to enjoy resettlement funding.⁴

The new rules fail to address the serious issue of “fake migrants” that has become a phenomenal problem in the Three Gorges area. Yet, it is the “fake migrants” that have become one of the most obvious and pressing problems with rural resettlement. I predict that the “fake migrants” will become an explosive problem in the future.

Further aggravating this situation, the new rules will allow two more types of people, with questionable status as legitimate migrants, to move into the reservoir area: those who, due to a job transfer, become qualified to transfer their household registration to the reservoir, and; those who are released after serving a jail sentence who lived in the reservoir area before serving their sentence.

Second, the “2001 Rules and Regulations” fail to address other possible problems with resettlement. As I pointed out in my 1999 Strategy and Management article, moving people out of the reservoir area is far from being a perfect solution. For one, resettling rural migrants in remote provinces and regions of the country can help relieve the pressure of population on the reservoir environment but may bring about new problems. Also, to speed the pace of resettlement, local governments in the Three Gorges area are trying every possible means to deceive migrants to leave by lying and even forcing them to resettle in other places outside the reservoir area under the banner of “resettlement governed by the legal system.” If this situation is allowed to continue, a historic tragedy⁵ would be repeated: forcing migrants to leave the reservoir area only to see them return to their place of origin because they are dissatisfied with the conditions in resettlement regions.

Third, the new rules assume that the reservoir area will be able to develop and upgrade its industrial sector. But the rules also stress that “if local governments and relevant units want to enlarge the scale or raise the standard in reconstruction activities, they should be responsible for raising the money which exceeds the resettlement funding quota determined by the project authority.” This makes the state’s prior commitment to support the rebuilding of the reservoir area and the reorganization of industry an empty promise. Without financial support, technical assistance and other effective measures from the central government, it will be extremely difficult for the poverty-stricken Three Gorges area in general, and the Wanzhou area with its weak economy in particular, to develop economically and upgrade its industrial sector. As a result of this, the funding earmarked for resettlement will likely be diverted to other uses, such as upgrading industrial infrastructures or for corrupt purposes, creating a series of other problems.

Fourth, it is absolutely right that the new rules emphasize the strict management of resettlement funds. But the management methods remain unchanged, entirely relying on traditional administrative measures rather than on the improvement of the legal system, press scrutiny, and public oversight. Without appropriate decentralization of power, without transparency and democracy in resettlement policy decision-making and the use of relocation funds, more problems with the management of resettlement funds will be unavoidable.

Finally, despite more emphasis on environmental preservation in the new rules, the actual environmental regulations look vague and general. Moreover, given the tremendous population pressure created by the resettlement of Three Gorges migrants, it is doubtful whether local officials at all levels in the reservoir area will be able to pay more attention to the environmental issue in the relocation schemes.

Editor’s Notes:
1. A capital intensive production method with “advanced” technology that incorporates environmental protection measures and thus is seen as a way of relieving population pressure on the land.

2. The point of this shift in emphasis in the new rules and regulations is to stop local governments from demanding more funds to build larger cities, better infrastructure, and more factories than they will lose to the dam. For example, the newly-built county seat of Zigui, near the dam site, is twice the size of the old. According to the new rules, if a local government wants to build bigger towns, with more and better infrastructure and enterprises, then they should find the extra money on their own, and not expect the Three Gorges project authority to pay more than the value of what was lost. This is an attempt to stop runaway resettlement costs.

3. Premier Zhu was probably referring to cases where officials who have used resettlement funds corruptly were executed or sentenced to life imprisonment. See the English version of Three Gorges Probe: March 24, 2000, the Chinese version of Three Gorges Probe: July 7, 2000 and China Daily, March 15, 2000.

4. These illegitimate migrants or “fake migrants” obtain their status through cronyism and corruption.

5. In which dam evacuees (from the Danjiangkou dam on the Han River, the Sanmenxia dam on the Yellow River, and the Xin’anjiang reservoir in Zhejiang province, for example) were mobilized, even forced, to move far away in haste. They were unable to restore their livelihoods and faced hostility from the host population who resented their different culture and competition for scarce farmland. As a result, many returned to their homeland where they became landless, homeless, and lived as refugees.