(February 28, 2010) Ecuador’s strategic default on some of its external debt last year has drawn much commentary and generated passionate reactions. Some commentators who advocate creating a mechanism for addressing odious or illegitimate debt encouraged Ecuador to repudiate its obligations and have generally applauded its decision to do so. For those who are sympathetic to efforts to create such a mechanism, however, this enthusiasm may be misplaced.
(November 27, 2007) There is a growing body of scholarship that attempts to identify workable mechanisms to enable sovereigns to repudiate ‘odious’ sovereign debt – obligations incurred by sovereign regimes that provide no corresponding benefit to the sovereign debtor itself.
(March 16, 2007) This Article proposes that sovereign nations and their creditors adopt a contractual approach to the seemingly intractable problem of odious debt. Odious debt is generally defined as an obligation incurred by a despotic or illegitimate leader that provides no value to the population of the sovereign.