The purge of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli has rattled the People’s Liberation Army, reportedly prompting a quiet rebellion within its ranks and beyond.

By Michael Zhuang for The Epoch Times

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In Brief by Probe International

The recent purge of two towering figures in China’s military—Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia (a battle-hardened veteran and long-time Xi ally) and Joint Staff Department chief Liu Zhenli—has sent shockwaves far beyond Beijing’s corridors of power. What began as yet another “anti-corruption” sweep in late January 2026 has morphed into something far more ominous: visible cracks in Xi Jinping’s iron grip on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Insiders report that a breakdown in command is occurring within the Chinese military, with passive noncompliance spreading from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to the civilian administrative system.

Zhang, once seen as Xi’s most trusted military confidant and a “princeling” with deep networks from China’s 1980s border conflicts, and Liu, the operational brain behind joint command, were publicly accused of having “seriously trampled” on Xi’s absolute authority over the military—a rare, blistering political indictment that goes well beyond garden-variety graft. The CMC, China’s supreme military body, is now down to just two members: Xi himself and the recently elevated Zhang Shengmin, a political disciplinarian with scant combat command experience. The top brass has been gutted, leaving a leadership vacuum that analysts warn has hollowed out readiness and eroded trust.

Insiders report lower-level PLA officers—already rattled by waves of purges—are quietly dragging their feet on orders. When CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin directed the PLA’s theater commands and branches to issue public pledges of “resolute support for the CMC’s unified command” (code for absolute loyalty to Xi), the response was deafening in its silence—or worse, subtle defiance. Units issued no enthusiastic declarations; many simply ignored the directive. Insiders describe CMC teams dispatched to prod lower echelons into formal loyalty statements to Xi personally—only to meet stonewalling and noncompliance.

This isn’t isolated to the barracks. The malaise is bleeding into the civilian bureaucracy. Military university administrators, defense researchers entangled in the regime’s “military-civil fusion” push (blending civilian tech and resources into warfighting), and even broader administrative ranks show growing reluctance to jump when Beijing calls. Public loyalty rituals meet muffled echoes or outright resistance, signaling a quiet rebellion against Xi’s hyper-centralized model.

At its core, this exposes a perennial CCP fault line: the party’s obsession with political loyalty over battlefield competence. Decades of prioritizing ideological purity have bred a force where officers fear their own leader more than external threats. Purge after purge—now claiming hundreds of generals—creates paranoia, not preparedness. Lower ranks hesitate to act decisively, lest today’s order becomes tomorrow’s evidence of disloyalty. The result? A regime whose administrative muscle is atrophying just as Xi demands ever-tighter control.

Whether this passive resistance hardens into something more active remains the question haunting Zhongnanhai—but for now, Xi’s drive for absolute command risks undermining the very regime it seeks to fortify.