A senior Pentagon veteran’s assessment exposes a volatile nuclear-armed superpower that may struggle to sustain high-intensity warfare.

By Sam Cooper for The Bureau

In Brief by Probe International

The recent arrest of General Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission and a close associate of Xi Jinping, has sent shockwaves through Beijing’s military establishment. In the absence of Zhang, analysts are concerned that Xi’s reliance on yes-men may prevent him from accessing honest assessments about the military’s readiness for conflict, particularly regarding Taiwan, which Xi has set a 2027 deadline for military preparedness.

Tony C. T. Hu, a former U.S. Defense Department official, argues that the accusations against Zhang are likely false and that the real issue is the military’s lack of readiness. Hu believes Zhang was one of the few individuals capable of providing Xi with truthful insights about the capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which he asserts are insufficient for the ambitious timelines set by Xi, particularly in light of the army’s historical lack of combat experience since the 1979 border war with Vietnam.

Hu points to alarming data about these vulnerabilities, such as the close spacing of intercontinental ballistic missile silos in Xinjiang, which could easily be targeted by a single American missile. This creates a precarious “launch on warning” posture for China, he says, where any perceived threat could trigger a nuclear response before verification, increasing the risk of catastrophic consequences.

Hu reveals that American forces in South Korea now have the capability to strike deep into northeastern China. This shift is part of a broader strategy to strengthen alliances with regional partners like Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, aimed at deterring Xi from pursuing aggressive military actions. Hu emphasized that maintaining peace through strength is essential, but the path to achieving this requires addressing the vulnerabilities and operational limitations of the Chinese military.

Hu also raises concerns about China’s use of organized crime networks as instruments of state power, suggesting that these networks are part of a broader strategy to influence demographics and politics in various regions, including the Pacific and Latin America. He argues that these criminal activities, often viewed as separate from state operations, are coordinated efforts to reshape political landscapes in favor of Beijing. This multifaceted approach, combined with China’s military shortcomings, underscores the complexities of the current geopolitical landscape and the potential for conflict if not managed carefully.

Hu warns that China’s military threat is both more dangerous and more brittle than ever. While the country possesses a growing arsenal of military capabilities, the political instability and lack of accurate information within its command structure could lead to profound misjudgments. This underscores the importance of deterrence, he says, as the West can no longer rely on rational decision-making from Beijing, making it crucial to maintain a strong defensive posture.

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