Allegations of corruption and shoddy construction at Fujian’s Tongan power project take centerstage as part of Beijing’s scripted political theater.

By Lisa Peryman for Probe International

A flagship pumped-storage hydropower station in Fujian, meant to anchor China’s grid stability and carbon-neutral ambitions, is reeling from state-media revelations of dangerously short anchor piles, fake grouting, and a major slope collapse.

Billed as a priority project valued at approximately US$1.06 billion, the Yongan power station is a cornerstone of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) for enhancing grid stability and supporting China’s green energy goals. But a probe led by the state-run Economic Information Daily has spotlighted severe allegations—from substandard materials and improper construction practices, to anchor piles that fail to meet design standards.

In an investigative report published last Thursday, the Daily cited multiple construction workers who indicated that fewer than a third of the dam’s installed piles are unlikely to meet design standards, with the majority being subpar. Of the 1,000 anchor piles specified in the dam’s design, only 600 have been installed, according to the probe—unpacked at length by the South China Morning Post (SCMP) in its coverage. Experts warned that if these claims are true, such defects could jeopardize the dam’s structural integrity. This concern was underscored in August when a significant collapse occurred at the lower reservoir slope project constructed by a subsidiary of PowerChina, a massive state-owned energy colossus with operations in more than 130 countries.

In its account of the dam’s critical defects, China Daily highlights contractor failure to inject cement grout into the majority of the site’s pile holes as required by construction specifications, instead choosing to apply a basic surface seal at hole entrances to mislead quality inspectors.

In September 2021, China’s National Energy Administration launched an ambitious plan to boost pumped-storage hydroelectricity (PSH) as a key component of the country’s renewable energy strategy, aiming for 62 GW of operational capacity by 2025 and over double that by 2030, which sparked a significant investment boom; however, by late 2023, concerns over hasty project approvals prompted a warning from authorities to the industry about the risks of “overzealous” development, leading to new regulations to offset “insufficient preliminary studies, superficial planning and unclear demand,” writes the SCMP.

Political Theater

While this level of public criticism is unusual for a priority project like Yongan, a closer look reveals the investigation aligns with President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaigns, which utilize state media to expose wrongdoing without destabilizing the system.

Other examples of Beijing’s focus on political theater—amplified by media signaling—were illuminated earlier this year in a review of the country’s renewed anti-corruption drive by the China Media Project (CMP), an independent research initiative established by The University of Hong Kong’s Journalism and Media Studies Centre.

The campaign, notes CMP, featured publicized cases of corruption, such as the expulsion of former Zhengzhou official Yang Zhengan for accepting bribes (bath house vouchers, expensive liquor) for influence, cases that serve to project an image of accountability while diverting attention from systemic issues.

“Swatting flies” (打苍蝇)—making examples of minor officials while keeping the main structure of power untouched—is part of a broader effort to enforce the Central Eight Regulations, which target official extravagance and misconduct. The media’s role in this process, writes CMP, is more about creating a facade of action with officials engaging in “meta-propaganda” to showcase their adherence to party directives.

To illustrate the absurdity of rules that are not actually enforced, CMP provides amusing snapshots of officials “scurrying” around to promote the “spirit” of the Central Eight Regulations through staged social media ops. These might include a photograph of officials at a cigarette counter for a reason that is not explained, but that might remind the viewer of local Party official, Chen Yinfu, who was expelled for repeatedly accepting cigarettes and alcohol as gifts from construction project managers during festive banquets.

As CMP points out, performance is everything but any genuine reform would shake the CCP’s firmly entrenched position as above the law and accountability.

In the case of the Yongan power station, the unusually blunt exposé by Economic Information Daily is not rogue journalism but likewise scripted political theater. The Daily’s on-site reporting, worker interviews, and follow-ups mirror tactics from Xi’s “Central Eight Regulations” campaigns, which seek to curb extravagance and demand “formalism-busting” via media spotlights. This builds public faith by showing the Party “hears” concerns without opening floodgates to dissent.

In Xi Jinping’s playbook, high-profile “fly-swatting” scandals permit the Party a tough look on corruption and quality while shielding the system itself. The louder the media spotlight on bath-house vouchers and cut-rate dam piles, the more it distracts from the untouchable tigers at the top.