China’s Fourth Plenary Session sets course for fortifying the country’s political system and economic model against the “raging storms” of Western containment, technological sanctions, and domestic vulnerabilities.

By Eerishika Pankaj for The China Tribune

For the original article this summary is based on, see the publisher’s website here: China’s Fourth Plenum: Towards a Fortress Economy While Reasserting Control.

In Brief by Probe International

A crucial event in China’s political calendar, the Fourth Plenary Session typically addresses institutional reforms and governance priorities. This year, the emphasis was on strengthening the economy and enhancing national security rather than pursuing liberalization or market reforms.

China analyst Eerishika Pankaj notes the tone throughout was one of “mobilisation and vigilance,” as if China were bracing for an “era of perpetual contestation.” In this case, the “raging storms” President Xi Jinping rallies China to brace against are from the West—which Pankaj breaks down to “Western containment, technological sanctions, and domestic vulnerabilities.”

To that end, she says, the Chinese Communist Party has identified its primary strategic task as building a modern industrial system centered on advanced technologies like artificial intelligence and semiconductors, signaling both ambition to lead in these fields and anxiety over reliance on foreign imports. Additionally, the plenum highlighted the need to boost domestic consumption to sustain growth amid declining exports, advocating for effective investment while avoiding direct cash transfers to households to maintain the Party’s control over economic levers without empowering the consumer class.

While promoting self-reliance (“zìlì gēngshēng”), which Pankaj calls the Fourth Plenum’s leitmotif, the message was also one of commitment to “high-standard opening up” and selective engagement with global markets, marking a shift towards “managed globalization.” This approach allows for foreign investment that enhances China’s technological capacity while tightening control over data and capital flows. “Yet this engagement will be transactional and hierarchical,” Pankaj writes, “governed by China’s terms rather than global liberal norms.”

Pankaj frames the emphasis on Xi’s authority and the invocation of a “fighting spirit” as revealing an underlying insecurity within the Party, as it seeks to rally against internal challenges and reinforce ideological cohesion. The Party believes that by combining technological self-sufficiency with a strong ideological framework, it can sustain its legitimacy while maintaining tight control. However, Pankaj warns this approach comes with significant risks; equating self-reliance with self-containment could lead to rigidity rather than resilience.

As China sets its sights on 2030, she concludes, it is crucial for the world to understand that the true message of the plenum extends beyond economic concerns — it is fundamentally civilizational. Beijing is gearing up for a prolonged effort to endure rather than simply outcompete the West. The key question remains whether this strategy can coexist with genuine innovation, a challenge that will ultimately shape the legacy of the Xi era.