Two reports claim foreign interference in Canada’s 2025 election was “small scale,” but findings reveal Beijing-backed campaigns targeting Chinese-Canadian voters and Conservative candidate Joe Tay, alongside Russian online manipulation.

By Probe International

Two reports released last week sought to reassure Canadians that foreign interference during the last general election did not compromise its overall integrity, with identified incidents labeled as “small scale.”

Nevertheless, findings from the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force and the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (CEIPP) for Canada’s 45th general election (held in spring 2025) raise concerns about the independence of these oversight bodies. Despite attempts at foreign interference—primarily involving online activities by actors linked to China and Russia—no public warnings were issued during the election that resulted in Mark Carney becoming prime minister.

These efforts, disclosed the SITE report, included transnational repression and the amplification of conflicting narratives about political candidates on social media platforms, specifically targeting Chinese-speaking users in Canada, alongside Russian-led efforts to leverage its foreign information manipulation and interference networks online.

The CEIPP’s retrospective report on the implementation of the Protocol, specifies the circumstances and methods for communicating incidents that jeopardize the integrity of Canada’s elections during a campaign. Managed by a panel of five public servants featuring several senior deputy ministers and the Clerk of the Privy Council, who serves as Canada’s top bureaucrat, CEIPP has the authority to issue public warnings during an election campaign if it determines that one or more incidents pose a threat to Canada’s electoral process. SITE is charged with monitoring these activities and providing briefings to the CEIPP panel.

Among the incidents deemed “small scale,” officials revealed they detected a Beijing-backed information operation on the social media platform WeChat aimed at influencing Chinese-Canadian perceptions of Liberal leader Mark Carney, initiated by a popular news account linked to the Chinese Communist Party.

Additionally, a concerning campaign was observed against Conservative candidate Joe Tay, known for his opposition to Chinese government policies and Beijing’s crackdown on civil rights in Hong Kong. Last year, Hong Kong police issued warrants for six overseas activists, including Tay, offering bounties of approximately $185,000 for information leading to their arrests. In April, SITE reported this operation was active on social media platforms popular among Chinese-speaking users in Canada, such as Facebook, WeChat, TikTok and sister app Douyin, highlighting two significant trends: coordinated amplification of content related to Tay’s arrest warrant and the suppression of search terms associated with his name on certain platforms.

In 2024, CEIPP faced criticism for failing to alert Canadians about foreign interference observed during the 2019 and 2021 federal elections. A report from the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) deemed the CEIPP panel “not adequately designed” to fulfill its purpose. Established before the 2019 election, the panel was intended to protect against foreign interference similar to that seen in the 2016 U.S. election and the Brexit vote. NSIRA’s report highlighted significant deficiencies, noting the panel was primarily focused on online disinformation campaigns, even though traditional foreign interference was identified as a more pressing threat.

The report also revealed tensions between CEIPP and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), with differing views on the significance of foreign interference in specific ridings. For instance, a panel member claimed the election was “clean” despite “some stuff,” while CSIS director David Vigneault pointed to strong evidence of Chinese interference in a particular riding, suggesting that the panel’s high threshold for action and lack of communication could mislead the public about the actual level of foreign interference.

Both CEIPP and SITE were established by the Justin Trudeau administration, which touted the creation of a number of security organizations, including oversight bodies such as the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) as well as NSIRA. However, critics warn these agencies were primarily designed to placate Canadians about their safety while neglecting to confront genuine threats, especially from China. As highlighted by law professor Bruce Pardy, executive director of Rights Probe, and Patricia Adams, executive director of Probe International, NSICOP and NSIRA operate under a veil of strict secrecy, forming part of a troubling framework that seeks to create the illusion of electoral security while simultaneously shielding the government from scrutiny, obscuring critical evidence, and stifling accountability.

This situation raises urgent and unsettling questions about the independence of election security frameworks like CEIPP and SITE, and how much trust Canadians can truly place in their assessments of “small scale” foreign interference and its potentially far-reaching consequences.