A student-run newspaper investigation reveals the CCP is orchestrating a widespread intelligence-gathering campaign at Stanford University. In short, there are Chinese spies at Stanford.
By Garret Molloy and Elsa Johnson | The Stanford Review
In Brief
This investigation conducted by The Stanford Review between July 2024 and April 2025, draws on interviews with Stanford faculty, students, and China experts specializing in technology transfer and espionage, corroborated by public records and expert analysis. Most interview subjects agreed to speak only on condition of anonymity. The term “spying” is defined by “work for a government or other organization by secretly collecting information about enemies or competitors,” not in any legal capacity.
The investigation’s key findings highlight the activities of a CCP agent impersonating a Stanford student who targeted students through social media (focusing mainly on women in China-related fields) for the purposes of identifying sympathetic contacts and gathering intelligence. Financial lures, visa loopholes, and WeChat-monitored communication were the means the agent, operating under the alias Charles Chen, utilized in an effort to reel in targets. In another instance, Chen Song, a member of the People’s Liberation Army, was found to have been covertly sending Stanford research to China after she lied about her involvement to obtain a J-1 visa to conduct research at the university.
Stanford’s role as an AI leader makes it a strategic focus for Beijing as part of its “Made in China 2025” plan to unseat the United States as the dominant force in frontier technologies. Of Stanford’s Chinese international student population, approx. 1,129 are estimated to report actively to the CCP. Under China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, citizens are mandated to support and cooperate with state intelligence work “regardless of location”. Such laws leave little room for students to opt out of the state’s directive, with those engaged in fields such as AI and robotics marked as particularly attractive targets to enlist for intelligence gathering. Students with family members in China are especially vulnerable to coercion efforts, with relatives at high risk of retribution if cooperation is not forthcoming.
One student interviewed relayed a discussion with a CCP member who had been educated at Stanford. According to this former student, the Chinese Scholarship Council (CSC) directs students’ research priorities to align with state-sponsored research activities at Stanford. The Council is said to fund an estimated 15% of Chinese students at American universities.
The Stanford Review notes its investigation had been prompted by a “pervasive silence” on the issue brought about by “transnational repression, $64 million in Chinese funding, and allegations of racial profiling.” The latter accusation triggered the dissolution of the China Initiative in 2022, a project designed to prevent Chinese espionage. Speaking to The Review, Asian American Congresswoman Michelle Steel described claims of racial profiling as “a deliberate effort to prevent Beijing’s profiling and harassment of their citizens from coming to light.”
This article is the first in a series covering Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence on the campus of Stanford University.
Read the full report at the publisher’s website here.
Categories: Foreign Interference, Security


