Police diplomacy, a specialized area of foreign policy for China, deepens its security-related influence globally and its capacity to target expatriates.

By South China Morning Post via Bangkok Post

Summary

Amid escalating geopolitical tensions with the United States, China is positioning itself as a security partner, with policing diplomacy playing an increasingly significant role. In 2022, President Xi Jinping introduced the Global Security Initiative (GSI), advocating for “indivisible security” and promoting cooperation in areas like counterterrorism, cybersecurity, biosecurity, emerging technologies, and international policing. This initiative contrasts with the “collective security” model of the U.S. alliance network.

In March 2023, Beijing amended its Organic Law of the State Council to require state councillors to take on greater diplomatic responsibilities. Since then, Wang Xiaohong, state councillor and public security minister, has been actively engaging with international counterparts from countries like New Zealand, Finland, and Iran to enhance law enforcement cooperation. At the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum in eastern China last September, Wang announced that China had trained 2,700 foreign law enforcement officers in 2023 and plans to train 3,000 more by 2025, with consultants deployed to countries in need.

By providing training and police equipment, China aims to bolster its security and diplomatic standing without assuming the role of a guarantor [the GSI Concept Paper notably lacks any commitment to act as a security guarantor for partnering countries, unlike the United States]. A research paper by the International Institute for Strategic Studies highlights that China’s police training focuses on fostering security relations in strategically important regions, including Africa and Latin America, where China has significant business interests.

Despite these efforts, China’s policing diplomacy faces increasing scrutiny. In December 2022, Italy halted joint patrols with Chinese police following allegations that Beijing used “service stations” to pressure expatriates to return to China. Similarly, Papua New Guinea and Fiji have adjusted their policing agreements with China due to concerns raised by Australia and other stakeholders.

This report is available at the publisher’s website here.

Foreign Interference and “Troll Farms”

Australia: In 2024, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) informed a Senate hearing that concerns over foreign interference led to a change in its approach to cooperation with Chinese police. [See: “AFP Stopped Allowing Chinese Police to Operate in Australia Over Foreign Interference Concerns, Senate Hearing Told”].

The AFP revealed to the parliamentary hearing it had ended a policy allowing Chinese police to operate in Australia following a 2019 incident exposed by ABC’s Four Corners program. AFP Deputy Commissioner Ian McCartney described the 2019 case as a turning point due to heightened awareness of foreign interference threats. He stated that the policy was discontinued after June 2019 and that the decision was made to stop Chinese police visits due to the increasing risk of foreign interference. This change came after Chinese officers, under AFP protocols, escorted a 59-year-old Australian resident back to China, following a 2014 incident where Chinese police entered Australia unannounced to convince a Melbourne bus driver to return to China.

Canada: In April 2023, a former student of a contentious international police training program at the Justice Institute of British Columbia was criminally charged in the United States for allegedly orchestrating an online network of harassment against American residents who express opposition to the Chinese Communist Party. [See: “Chinese Secret Police Agent Charged in U.S. Undertook Training in B.C.”].

Chen Zhichen was criminally charged in the United States for allegedly leading an online network that harassed Chinese nationals living in America who opposed the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The charges were part of a broader indictment against 34 officers from China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS), including Chen, at the time a member of the MPS First Bureau, China’s secret police agency.

Chen was accused of orchestrating an online “troll farm” that targeted dissidents on issues such as Hong Kong democracy, Tibetan and Taiwanese independence, allegations of genocide against Uyghur people, unsanctioned religious expression, and the Tiananmen Square Massacre. The indictment claims that Chen led a team that posted, monitored, and updated content on social media platforms to influence perceptions and target critics of the CCP.

Chen’s connection to JIBC was revealed by the Found in Translation Substack website, which linked her Canadian education and training to her role in the MPS. Chen attended JIBC as part of a program that welcomed over a dozen Chinese police academies between 2014 and 2020, generating $3.3 million for the institute. The program included coursework on the Canadian judicial system and hands-on police training from the Vancouver Police Department.

Concerns about the program’s potential national security risks led to its shutdown in 2021. Simon Fraser University criminologist Rob Gordon noted that the program could pose risks, as the recruits could use their training and certificates for prospective immigration applications. JIBC confirmed that Chen’s education was within its academic program and not the police academy it runs for prospective B.C. police officers.

This report is available at the publisher’s website here.