Nigeria is to enter final talks to win $18bn of debt relief in the biggest ever write-off by the Paris Club of western creditors. The deal, which could help the country save $1.0bn or more each year in loan repayments, has been widely presented as evidence of improvement in both governance in Africa and in the west’s attitude to the continent.

Amid the mutual congratulation, it is worth taking a moment to compare the impressive-sounding numbers with another figure that originates in Nigeria, Africa’s most populous nation. It is the estimated $3.5m or more worth of crude oil that is stolen each day from the Niger Delta by conspiracies of government officials, militias, the military and expatriates. On an annual basis, the value of that theft would exceed the debt repayment saving.

As governments in Africa and the west focus on key issues such as debt, aid and trade, too little attention is being paid to a problem of which the Niger Delta is a prime example: the long-standing network of corrupt relationships between western governments, rich nation businesses and African elites. Despite promises by all parties to do better, Nigeria’s oil industry – Africa’s largest, pumping $150m a day at current prices – remains largely opaque and unaccountable. Unless crucial improvements are made, the “year of Africa” may yet be remembered as another episode in the shameful looting of a continent.

At first glance, there seems to be much activity under way that could help address this problem. A new European Union (EU) directive on money laundering has just been agreed and the British government and private sector are working together on a committee set up to tackle corruption issues. Nigeria has introduced or plans to introduce measures to monitor budget spending, show how its oil revenues are distributed and disclose more information about payments by multinationals to the government. Some highprofile Nigerians are being pursued over corruption.

Yet, while a few important changes have been made, other measures are more complicated or less impressive than they might seem. Until recently, the Nigerian finance ministry website showing the distribution of oil money to the country’s 36 states carried details from just three of the past 15 months. Results of a long-promised audit of the state oil company and its multinational joint venture partners are still awaited. Many Nigerians have very mixed feelings about the corruption prosecutions, welcoming the start of action they see as long overdue while noting that those being pursued appear mainly to be enemies of President Olusegun Obasanjo or otherwise politically expendable.

Nor is London keeping its side of the bargain on tackling corruption. Britain is not among the 32 countries, including France and Nigeria, that have so far ratified the 2003 United Nations convention on corruption. The UK government says the reason is that it has still not implemented fully the 2002 Proceeds of Crime Act. This was supposed to facilitate Britain’s offer of legal assistance to foreign countries such as Nigeria, which has complained for years about London’s failure to help recover the $1.3bn or more looted under the late dictator Gen Sani Abacha and processed through British financial institutions.

A similar sense of grudging inertia surrounds the UK’s 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act. This was touted as the law that made it possible to pursue British citizens and companies guilty of bribing foreign public officials. To date, not one prosecution has been launched. Even the government’s claim that several investigations have begun under a more streamlined system is treated with suspicion by some anti-corruption campaigners. They point to a burst of activity last year to pre-empt an inspection by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which in March finalised a document assessing Britain’s work on combating bribery. The OECD cautiously welcomed the last-minute changes but made substantial criticisms. In other words, London was found wanting just as Tony Blair was trying to persuade fellow G8 leaders to adopt more African-friendly policies at their July summit.

At other times, Britain has not tried to hide its double standards. The Commission for Africa set up and chaired by Mr Blair to devise an agenda for the G8 summit highlighted the failure of rich country export credit agencies to tackle corruption. Yet Britain’s Export Credits Guarantee Department has shown little inclination to follow up allegations that a consortium including MW Kellogg, a client, agreed to pay $170m of bribes to secure billions of dollars of work on a giant Nigerian gas plant.

Britain and Nigeria have offered each other many flattering words over the past 12 months on debt and other issues. But in both cases their actions on corruption and transparency look spasmodic, selective and oversold internationally to create an impression of fundamental reform. Historic injustice means debt relief is morally right – but so is greater pressure on both governments and others to do far more about an outrage that has dragged down so many African nations for so long.

The writer is an associate fellow of Chatham House’s Africa programme and author of a July report on the crisis in the Niger Delta.

Michael Peel, Financial Express, October 21, 2005