Probe International

October 3, 2003

A leaked Asian Development Bank report says experienced hydro consultants could have predicted the catastrophic damages caused by Vietnam’s Yali dam but Swedish firm SWECO, Vietnam’s longtime hydro advisors, failed to do so.

SWECO failed to warn Vietnam about downstream risks

Experienced hydro consultants could have predicted the catastrophic damages caused by Vietnam’s Yali dam but SWECO – Sweden’s largest engineering consulting firm and Vietnam’s longtime hydro advisors – failed to do so, according to a leaked Asian Development Bank report.

Large spills from the Yali dam killed approximately 25 people in 1999 and 2000, while thousands more are suffering recurring damage to their crops and property several hundred kilometres downstream in Cambodia.

The report (Vol 1, Vol 2) by Worley International (New Zealand-based consulting firm), states that Yali discharges transformed the Se San River into a “lethal turbulent channel in which people cannot survive . . . . People being swept down rocky chutes suffer numerous violent collisions with rocks which eventually kill them, or leave them too damaged to swim, so that they drown even in the relatively calm waters downstream of the chute.” [Emphasis added by Worley]

The owner of Yali dam, Electricity of Vietnam, “will be considered liable” for damages, according to Worley. But the report also criticizes EVN’s consultants, particularly SWECO, for underestimating the downstream effects of Yali and Se San 3, a second dam now under construction.

“Although the general consequences of reservoir filling, commissioning, seasonal flow regulation, and peaking operation of Yali and Se San 3 were predictable,” writes Worley, “previous studies gave incomplete warning of them.”

Worley’s report is part of the Asian Development Bank’s 2000 appraisal of Se San 3, a second dam recommended by SWECO in 1999, the year Yali began operating.

“It would have been a simple step,” the report states, “ to appreciate that closure of the main Se San river at Yali or Se San 3 dam sites for 14 or 18 hours daily, or for longer periods. . . would have critical impacts on downstream populations and ecosystems.”

According to Worley, “[SWECO’s] belief that negative impacts of intermittent discharges will extend only 20 kilometres below the dam, even for a 6 hour closure of the turbine flows, is unfounded, and no experienced consultant could hold it.”

Worley also points out SWECO wrongly assumed only a few houses existed downstream of the dam sites. Worley estimates 1,400 houses are located within the first 100 kilometres of the sites, and that 2,500 households are entitled to immediate cash compensation for damages.

Worley describes SWECO’s analysis of Se San 3 impacts as “bad science” and its assumptions “unrealistic.” “A wider and more scientific analysis, less dedicated to a single site [Se San 3] and, dare one say, future consultant engineering work” is needed.

Worley concludes that SWECO’s overall approach to hydro planning is flawed: “SWECO’s ranking of Projects is a mere shuffling of cards . . . It does not represent a sound basin wide strategy for using water or other resources, and will lead to serious conflicts between water users within the basin in Vietnam, and between Vietnam and Cambodia.” Worley’s report, classified confidential by the Asian Development Bank, recommends that Electricity of Vietnam take immediate steps to improve public safety and prevent recurring damages downstream.

SWECO, meanwhile, has won contracts for work on the Se San 3 dam and EVN’s National Hydropower Plan.

Yali and Se San 3 are two of six large-scale hydro dams planned for the Se San River, a major Mekong tributary flowing from Vietnam’s central highlands through northeast Cambodia.

Notes

1. Worley reports (Vol 1, Vol 2) reviewed by Probe International:

“Yali/Se San3 Environmental and Social Impact Analysis Study,” April 2000, Asian Development Bank, PPTA 31362-01-VIE, 2 volumes.

Summary Environmental Impact Assessment, Phase II Final Report – Environmental, Social and Technical Analysis for Se San 3 Hydropower Project, February 2001, Asian Development Bank TA: 322-VIE.

2. See also “Leaked report criticizes Vietnam for unsafe dam operation,” Probe International Press Advisory, September 23, 2003.

3. For further critical analysis of SWECO’s Se San 3 recommendations, see: https://journal.probeinternational.org/2000/10/16/review-se-san-3-hydropower-project-feasibility-study/

For more information, CONTACT:

Gráinne Ryder, Policy Director, Probe International

Probe International is a Toronto-based citizens group investigating foreign aid and the dam building industry in the six-country Mekong region.

To view the PDF version of the Worley report please see Vol 1, Vol 2.