Dar Al-Hayat, Saudi Arabia
Raghida Dergham
May 21, 2003

New York — The mass graves, where thousands of Iraqis were thrown into by the toppled regime of Saddam Hussein, are enough evidence to explain why the culture of fear is rife among the Iraqi people, who were subjugated to an absolute authority by means of extermination crimes. These graves bring suit against Saddam and his regime and condemn both of them for perpetrating crimes.

However, they also remind Iraqis of their fear of Saddam, and reinforce their conviction that he will reappear to take revenge. This is the reason why eminent officials are hesitating to enter the political process, and as a result, the fundamentalists are bridging the gap.

As long as American and British troops will not find Saddam, the political process will remain incomplete and fragile. The former regime’s specter will remain a live nightmare, with its violence, killings and mass crimes.

This is why the occupation authority in Iraq will have to address a particular personal dimension, in addition to the local, regional and international dimensions.

The victories of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq will remain incomplete as long as the destiny of both Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein is unknown.

The terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia highlighted the need to deploy more efforts and mobilize all forces in order to bring an end to both men’s destiny.

For what might happen in Iraq could be a catastrophe for the coalition forces as well as for the country. Many Iraqis believe that Saddam is still in Baghdad, and that he can send people to kill whoever he wants, particularly his former friends who dared speak out against his regime.

This is “why most members of his government hesitate to surrender or adopt different positions. They fear he might come back and take revenge,” as one of them said. Some Iraqis also believe that Saddam is probably currently planning for military operations against the coalition troops that would cause them great damage. In fact, he always wanted to send Americans back home in many “body bags,” so that American people start insisting on withdrawing their troops from Iraq.

The occupation period, which is set to last at least one year, might bring this opportunity, if the claim that Saddam is still alive and planning for attacks is true. He and his two sons have more than a billion dollars to do so.

However, the immediate withdrawal of the American and British troops is the worst-case scenario for Iraq at this point, because it will certainly create great chaos and the total collapse of the country.

Even the war’s opponents, both states and individuals, want the occupation authority to last for the needed period before Iraq heads in the right direction, with the establishment of institutions and laws, and with an Iraqi government that is able to fulfill its mission.

Even the UN, its General Secretary and the Security Council, wants these forces to supervise the transitional period, and the worst-case scenario possible now is to hand Iraq over to the UN, because it is neither able nor prepared to fulfill this mission.

When Somalia was handed to international organizations too quickly, everybody suffered a series of catastrophes. American officials insist that the aim behind a draft resolution that would give wide prerogatives to the U.S.-UK occupation authority is to enable this authority to work within an international legitimacy and backing, which would help it achieve its missions more rapidly, and consequently operate a withdrawal the soonest possible.

In fact, the Americans do not want to stay in Iraq for a long time or forever. The shortest period expected by the occupation authority is one year, as stipulated in the text of the American-British-Spanish draft resolution.

The first thing the U.S. and the UK stated in the draft resolution is that they are an occupational authority for practical and legal reasons relevant to the responsibilities and the competences of the occupation authority. The draft resolution is a first of its kind, for it is the first time the Security Council agrees upon wide prerogatives for an occupation authority, after it opposed the war itself.

It is one of its kind too, because the prerogatives encompasses the establishment of an Iraqi transitional authority until a Cabinet is formed, and classifies the oil sector among the occupation authority’s competences, albeit under the supervision of an international committee on decisions related to oil exports and revenue spending.

Arab newspapers and elites have gotten used to saying that the goal behind the occupation of Iraq is to control the oil, a reason some people see reinforced with the draft resolution’s dedication of American control over the oil sector.

The truth is that the draft resolution, according to the global American policy, includes prerogatives that do lead to meeting American oil interests, but do not involve controlling Iraqi oil and its revenues.

Indeed, the international advisory committee, which includes representatives of the UN, the IMF, the World Bank and the Arab Fund For Social and Economic Development, has a role in taking the decisions relative to the oil sector and its revenues through “the Iraqi Aid Fund.”

This fund is a temporary body that will last during the occupation period, until an Iraqi Cabinet and institutions are established. Many modifications will be made to the draft resolution, before it is agreed upon. Most amendments will be related to the prerogatives of the special Coordinator, who will be appointed by the UN General Secretary.

Most countries seek to reinforce these prerogatives; yet they cannot equal the occupation authority’s role. For the first responsibility should remain in the hands of the authority, according to international laws and conventions.

This does not mean that the role of the Coordinator will be minimized to that of a mere employee who must agree to what the occupation authority wants – quite the contrary. The most important role of the Coordinator is to monitor the occupation authority’s actions in order to detect and reveal potential shortcomings or violations. He cannot be an equal partner, for this kind of partnership will restrain his actions. The best role of the special Coordinator is to be the Iraqis’ partner, and the international community’s eyes and ears.

There are many other unprecedented points in the draft resolution, some of them that contrast former Security Council resolutions, and some that are arrogant.

Nevertheless, there are two important things in the resolution that should not be ignored: lifting the sanctions on Iraq and reducing the quota of oil revenues of the compensation fund for invading Kuwait from 52% to 5%.

It is true that by lifting the sanctions after the regime has been toppled – even though the Security Council used to link the lifting to the international inspectors’ report – is a statement to the effect that Iraq has no mass destruction weapons.

However, the current situation could be summed up as follows: Iraq is rid from both the regime and the sanctions, and this is extremely useful to it, because for instance, it will stop having to pay one fourth of its oil revenues to compensate for what the former regime did.

Iraqis need this money to rebuild their country; and this is a suggestion has been made idea to delay Iraq’s debt repayment (400 million).

Among the priorities identified in the draft resolution, Iraqis should suggest the themes they deem are in the country’s best interest for fostering a deep-seated dialogue that would lead to making the right decisions.

A well-informed Iraqi source established a sheet that expressed important opinions and themes, among which is that the internal Iraqi developments have shown the “peoples’ need for a monarchical-constitutional regime, instead of a Republic.”

But, due to the lack of a capable personality, and if the Iraqis choose the “republic” regime, it should be “a democratic constitutional, bicameral republic. Both councils shall be elected by Parliament with a quasi-total separation of the executive and the legislative authorities.”

The most important reason for this preference is Iraq’s experience with the republic, which took it into three coups d’Etat to a tyrannical regime that divided the Iraqi society.

As for the claim that elections would lead to the establishment of an “Islamic republic,” this is refused beforehand, for it is groundless, and Iraqis do not need this alternative if there is stability and rule of law. In case Iran directly intervenes to impose an “Islamic republic,” the U.S. and the UK know how to stop it.

On the level of Iraq’s foreign policy, while it is claimed time and again that this country should welcome Palestinian refugees, the source said it is “not the right time to discuss this matter, and that it will all depend on what the Palestinian Authority decides.” Iraq officially recognizing Israel is also not a priority, for “we need to wait for the peace process results and the final position of the Palestinian Authority and that of the Arab world before.”

As for regional relations, whether they be Arab countries or Iran or Turkey, the source believes they should be based on “cohabitation” and “friendly policies,” while working rapidly to resolve pending points of disagreement, such as water and “joint defense treaties,” in addition to reinforcing trade and stressing the non-intervention principle in each others’ internal affairs.

Logically, if the U.S. and the UK succeed in transforming the occupation period into a period of recovery for Iraq, from one of oppression and to its rehabilitation governed by freedom and prosperity, the main loyalty of the newly-established regime will be to Washington and London.

This requires being aware of the need to restore basic services and security, in addition to the Iraqis’ need to regain their freedom of movement and travel, along with main factors indicating that they belong to the rest of the prosperous world. The Iraqis’ hatred for the former regime resulted in turning them “from a proud people to poor beggars,” as one Iraqi source said. It was generated by the culture of a memory, and a deep-seated fear that will only fade when it is proven that Saddam Hussein has disappeared – and not only that his regime was toppled.