When the Thai economy collapsed in 1997, many business leaders and their urban middle class employees believed that politicians had failed them.

When the Thai economy collapsed in 1997, many business leaders and their urban middle class employees believed that politicians had failed them. They threw their support behind a new draft constitution, although few understood the draft in detail. But the fact that politicians strongly opposed the draft only gave it added public appeal.

Within months, Bangkok residents took to the streets and forced the new constitution’s adoption.

The public had grown weary of politicians who bought votes and then used their position to recoup the investment. Governments had been toppled by corruption scandals or military coups. There had been no political continuity, too little expertise in managing the economy, and not enough legislation to keep pace with social change.

Reformers had been divided over what to do: enlightened conservatives wanted more government stability, with checks and balances on politicians. Liberal activists wanted to sweep away the legacies of Thailand’s dictatorial past, making the authorities more responsive to the people.

Today, Thailand’s five-year-old constitution, with 336 clauses – 40,000 words in the English translation – is a comprehensive reform programme reflecting those sometimes conflicting aspirations.

The constitution established a raft of independent commissions. It included a charter of rights, provisions for impeachment proceedings, a freedom of information act, and plans for liberalisation of the state-dominated electronic media. It also set out 19 “directive principles”, including decentralisation, a bureaucratic overhaul, improved environmental laws, agrarian reform, privatisation of state enterprises and a new education system.

Anand Panyarachun, the former prime minister who led the drafting committee for the new constitution, said at the time that the quality of political life would improve, fraudulent elections would decrease and governments would be more stable.

Indeed, the quest for stability has succeeded spectacularly. In January 2001 the Thai Rak Thai party almost won an absolute majority in the first general election under the new charter. Previously, no party had come close.

Since then, Thai Rak Thai has absorbed two minor parties, and drawn two others into a dominant ruling coalition. Thaksin Shinawatra, the prime minister and party leader, has predicted Thai Rak Thai can remain in power for two or even four terms of four years. No previous elected government had survived one full term.

Political checks and balances have been harder to achieve. Fledgling independent institutions – including a strengthened Counter Corruption Commission, an independent election commission and a Constitutional Court – have struggled to establish their authority.

Politicians, including Mr Thaksin, have questioned why a handful of appointees should judge popularly-elected leaders. Various commissions have often had to court popular support through the media.

The independent institutions’ credibility is also being undermined by politicians. The ruling coalition has quietly constructed a majority caucus in the Senate, which is ostensibly apolitical but, in reality, is packed with politicians’ relatives and allies. The Senate is now using its power of appointment to fill “independent” boards with its friends.

The first election commissioners, who threw out scores of election results for electoral malpractices, were all denied re-appointment. New appointees to the Constitutional Court bench are also closely associated with leading government figures. The Counter Corruption Commission has become factionalised and perhaps compromised.

Liberals’ hopes for more participatory democracy have also fallen short. The first attempt to impeach ministers and officials for corruption in 1999 failed when the authorities insisted that the 50,000 signatures be “verified”. The first “People’s Bill” was modified in parliamentary committee and is now deadlocked. The plan to transfer control of media and telecommunication frequencies to independent commissions has also stalled.

The setbacks have already convinced some observers that the new charter is a failure. After the Election Commission failed to control vote-buying, Sombat Chantornvong, a political scientist from Thammasat University, concluded the constitution “will not be able to alter the nature of Thai politics in any significant way”.

Still, most people remain cautiously optimistic that the Thai political scene is gradually improving, as whistle-blowers, activists and even opposition politicians grow more bold in efforts to stamp out corrupt practices and abuses of power. In 2000, Sanan Kachornprasart, interior minister in the Democrat government, resigned after failing correctly to report his assets. A former health minister, also forced to resign over corruption, may lose his assets.

Mr Thaksin campaigned on a policy of “zero-tolerance” for corruption and is now under mounting pressure to act decisively against those in his own government suspected of misconduct.

Meanwhile, an initial five-year moratorium on amending the constitution has now expired, raising the prospect of further reforms.

There are politicians who want to alter rules that hinder them from switching parties. Some reformers want stronger provisions on conflict of interest.

But reformers fear that attempts to correct the charter’s weaknesses will open the door for politicians to undermine its strengths. They argue it is too soon to modify the charter.

Instead, the reformers’ strategy now is to hold the line. Gothom Arya, a long-time democracy activist and former election commissioner, notes: “Thai society is conservative . . . the constitution is more liberal than the society itself. The politicians will strike back. Civil society has to be more vigilant.”

The author has written several books on Thai history and politics

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Chris Baker, Financial Times,  December 6, 2002